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ABSTRACT
An Examination of Fraud from Three Perspectives: The Perpetrator, the Whistleblower,
and the Examiner
Ali Abdullah Alhasan
This dissertation is made up of three studies that look at fraud from three different
perspectives. The first study looks at fraud from the perspective of the perpetrator. The second
study examines fraud from the whistleblower’s perspective. The third study studies fraud from the
perspective of the investigator (internal auditor).
Study one utilized an online experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) to look at
whether technology has a psychological distancing effect on humans, and how that may affect
individuals to commit fraud. In addition, the study also examines how one’s familiarity with
technology, measured via iPhone screen time, can moderate the relationship between the
psychologic distancing effect of technology and fraudulent or unethical behavior. Results show a
moderate significant effect for the interaction, indicating that for those who are less familiar with
technology, their behavior did not differ regardless of which group they were in, whereas those
who are more familiar with technology behaved more ethically in the more real (low technology)
group. This study contributes to the fraud literature by demonstrating an advantage to hiring more
tech-savvy employees in terms of ethical behavior within the workplace.
Study two also utilized an online experiment on M-Turk to examine whistleblowers.
Specifically, the study manipulated the tone of code of conduct (positive versus negative) and
measured other traits (e.g., narcissism, perception of self-ethics, and ethics of other employees)
while participants were presented with an opportunity to blow the whistle on a fraud they were
witnessing. Results show that the tone of the code and some traits do play a role in determining
whether an employee decides to delay blowing the whistle or not. For example, in mediation
analysis a negative tone increased perception of termination for violations of the codes and hence
caused participants to report earlier. In addition, males and more educated were more likely to
delay whistleblowing. This study contributes to the whistleblowing and framing literature as it
documents how the framing of the codes could affect the ethical behavior of whistleblowing.
Study three utilized three paper-based experiments with a group of accounting
professionals/internal auditors. The three experiments looked at how level of detail, framing of
future promotion, and supervisor’s emotional intelligence may affect the choice of project to
investigate a potential fraud, how serious a project is rated, and how much in resources should be
allocated to the project. In addition, the study also looked at other personality traits like trust and
narcissism. Results show that level of detail does matter as individuals that perceived more detail
in a potential whistleblower tip tend to rate a higher seriousness and allocated more resources.
However, in experiments 2 and 3 the choice of projects was not affected by framing or supervisor
emotional intelligence, but instead additional analysis revealed an interesting interaction between
choice of project and the experiment manipulation on the amount of resource allocated to projects.
This study contributes to several fields (auditing, fraud, and psychology) as it documents the effect
of source credibility, framing and supervisor emotional intelligence on fraud investigators, which
could help companies provide additional training on what to say when blowing the whistle, and
what type of supervisors they should hire.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Fraud has proven to be very costly to organizations. On one hand, the organizations that
are victims to a fraud scheme suffer significant losses, and on the other hand, so do the
organizations that fail to detect the fraud early on (ACFE, 2020). Therefore, this dissertation seeks
to study fraud from three different perspectives: the perpetrator, the whistleblower, and the
examiner.
The first study in this dissertation looks at how technology can affect potential fraudsters.
Specifically, the study seeks to find out if technology affects psychological distance in a way that
affects fraudulent behavior. In addition, the study also seeks to investigate if the effect of
technology on fraudulent behavior is moderated by how attached or familiar to technology the
perpetrator may be. Results show some support for psychological distance playing a role in ethical
behavior. In addition, results show moderate support for attachment/familiarity to technology
acting as a moderator where we see individuals that are more familiar with technology were more
ethical in a more real (less psychologically distant) group compared to those in a less real group,
whereas those who are less familiar to technology did not differ between the two groups (more
and less real). The study holds practical implications as the past year has witnessed a shift towards
online technology due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Yan, 2020). Therefore, better understanding
how such a shift affects employees’ potential unethical behavior is important to organizations.
The second study examines the interplay between external factors (framing of a code of
conduct and perception of co-worker ethics) and internal factors (personality traits, perception of
self-ethics and demographics) on the decision to blow the whistle when financial incentives are
present. Results show that both external and internal factors matter as to whether a potential
whistleblower decides to report early or delay reporting to gain additional gains. The study
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contributes to the literature by providing a better understanding of what affects the whistleblower
specially since the Dodd Frank Act presents financial incentives for reporting fraud (Brink et al.,
2013). In addition, whistleblowing is of practical importance as it remains the number one tool to
preliminarily detect fraud (ACFE, 2020).
The third and last study explores fraud from the internal fraud examiner’s perspective. The
study seeks to better understand what factors affect the choice of fraud case to examine. In a series
of three experimental studies, results show that perception of how credible the whistleblower tip
is, and work experience affected both how the examiner rates the seriousness of the tip and how
much of the budget should be allocated to examine the tip. However, results show no support for
a relationship between examiner’s personal traits, such as skepticism, tolerance for ambiguity, trust,
narcissism, and risk literacy on the examiners’ preferences on which fraud case to examine. A
better understanding of factors that affect fraud examiners can improve the efficiency of future
examinations.
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ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a big shift towards online platforms. For example,
businesses shifted to working remotely, schools shifted to online teaching, and social interactions
shifted to social media. This study explores the consequences of such a shift on the perpetration of
fraud. While technology might increase psychological distance, which may lead to unethical
behavior, prior studies have shown mixed results for the relationship between psychological
distance and ethical behavior. Therefore, this study adds to prior literature by using an experiment
to examine the effect of psychological distance, via a more real versus more online environment,
on the commission of fraud. In addition, this study further contributes to the literature by
examining whether attachment to technology moderates the relationship, which is important for
organizations that are currently using online technology in its day-to-day operations. Finally,
results show that attachment to technology does have a moderating effect and that psychological
distance does play a role in ethical behavior. Future studies can further examine the role of
psychological distance via an improved design to better understand the distinct roles played by the
two measures (CLT versus ethical distancing). In addition, future research can also investigate
whether media richness theory has an effect on ethical behavior.

Key words: psychological distance, fraud, technology attachment, construal level theory
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Fraud occurs when an individual knowingly misrepresents the truth or conceals a material
fact to induce another individual to act to his/her detriment (Garner, 2004). There are several types
of fraud, including occupational fraud, which has become widespread globally (ACFE, 2020).
Occupational fraud represents a type of fraud in which an individual acts fraudulently against his
employer, and the ACFE 2020 Report to the Nations (ACFE, 2020) estimates approximately 2,500
cases of occupational fraud. Due to the negative impact and cost of fraud, researchers and
practitioners looked at ways to prevent and detect fraud, such as the use internal controls as a
preventive measure (Dorminey et al., 2012; Trompeter et al., 2013; Asare et al., 2013) and
anonymous whistleblowing hotlines to preliminarily detect fraudulent acts (Dworkin, 2007; Miceli
et al., 2009; Trompeter et al., 2013; Taylor & Curtis, 2010). The latter is very important as
approximately 43% of occupational frauds are preliminarily detected by tips (ACFE, 2020). With
the recent COVID-19 pandemic there has been a big shift to an online/virtual environment in
business and the education system (Yan, 2020), which may have important operational
ramifications as it relates to ethics and fraud (Dilla et al., 2013), especially as features from the
virtual world become incorporated in the business environment (Reeves & Read, 2009). This
change in workplace environment has highlighted and opened an important literature gap. With
many employees working virtually, does this increase or lessen the intent and likelihood of
occupational fraud? To help better understand this new environment, I utilized an experiment that
incentivized participants to misreport and examined the rate at which participants misreport,
contrasting two theories which predict opposite outcomes; Ethical Distancing (Kaufmann et al.,
2005), which claims that the more psychologically distant an individual is from an act the more
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likely that individual will behave unethically, and Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman,
2010), which claims that more psychologically distant individuals will behave more ethically.
Technology has witnessed significant advancement and usage in the recent period such as
the increase in Zoom users and the increase in e-learning capacity for schools that use Blackboard,
Canvas, etc. (Yan, 2020). In addition, consumer behavior has also changed during the pandemic
as online purchases in the grocery and retail sectors have experienced high growth (Hobbs, 2020).
While such advancements do have advantages to the world in general and to the business world
specifically, there may be disadvantages as well. For example, technology may make it easier for
individuals to commit fraud by introducing new fraud channels or even making it easier to
rationalize by distancing individuals from the act and the consequences of fraudulent behavior
(Guragai et al., 2017). However, not all individuals are accustomed, equally familiar, or attached
to technology, even if now they are required to use it on a daily basis. For instance, some
individuals might regularly use their smartphone, while others may not even own one. The
management literature looks into the moderating effect of technology. For example, Kuo (2013)
finds that technology readiness moderates the relationship between information systems qualities
and organizational performance by enhancing the positive effect information system quality on
organizational performance. In addition, Middlemist and Hitt (1981) found that technology
moderated the relationship between perceived work environment and subunit effectiveness in that
the relationship became more positive as technological complexity increased. However, to my
knowledge, no accounting research has looked at whether familiarity to technology can act as a
moderator between psychological distance and ethical behavior, particularly when working
remotely. In other words, might differences in how attached a person is to technology moderate
the distancing effect technology is thought to have?
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Reber et al. (2004) utilizes the concept of processing fluency to describe how easily
information is processed, noting that individuals process information easier if that information is
familiar to them. In addition, fluent processing of a piece of information will make people more
likely to think that the information is true and real (Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Utilizing an overgeneralized stereotype to illustrate the point, imagine the comparison of old and young individuals.
Older generations may have less technological interactions since technology was less pervasive
when they were young, whereas younger people today are practically raised with technology.
Therefore, younger individuals, being raised in a more technological world, are more familiar with
technology and will perceive the technological world as more real or part of their reality, which as
a result might reduce the psychological distancing effect compared to older individuals. As the
younger “Generation Z” (individuals born in the early 2000’s) enter the workforce and as many
work environments have shifted online during the COVID-19 pandemic, companies might have
employees that are more attached to technology than previous generations and knowing how such
a difference might affect their ethical behavior is important to business owners. The potential
impact on occupational fraud in this new environment, and which theory in my experimental
context best explains the phenomenon, would add to our understanding, and fill a current literature
gap.
The purpose of this research is twofold; one, to see which of the two theories, ethical
distancing, or Construal Level Theory, better explain the relationship between psychological
distance and commission of fraud as a main effect; and two, to see if attachment to technology
moderates the effect of psychological distance on fraudulent behavior. This study makes several
contributions to the fraud, technology, and criminology generational difference literature, which
has significant overlap to the accounting profession. In addition, due to limitations in the past,
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younger Generation Z members were too young to be included in such studies; hence this study
has a sample that includes such individuals who were born and raised surrounded by technology
and smartphones. Furthermore, this study is timely in the sense it comes during the COVID-19
pandemic when more and more individuals are working remotely and utilizing technology.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: (2) the Background and Hypothesis
section presents the related literature in fraud, technology, and distancing and the hypothesis. (3)
The Methodology presents how the study is designed, who are the participants, the experimental
tasks/procedures, and the variables measured. (4) The Analysis section presents the results. (5)
The Discussion section presents a summary of the practical and theoretical contribution made by
the study, in addition to its limitations.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS:
2.1 Fraud & Asset Misappropriation
The ACFE Report to the Nations (ACFE, 2020) shows that occupational fraud is
widespread with an estimated 2,500 cases reported and spread over twenty-three industries and
125 countries. These occupational frauds can be categorized in three main categories: asset
misappropriation, corruption, and financial statements fraud. This research focuses on asset
misappropriation, as it is the most common scheme used, making up 86% of total fraud cases in
the report (ACFE, 2020).
To better understand why people commit fraud, Cressey (1950) built upon Sutherland’s
(1940) White Collar Crime theory and came up with what is now referred to as the fraud triangle.
Based on the fraud triangle, for fraud to occur the perpetrator must be able to rationalize the act,
perceive an opportunity to act, and must have an incentive or pressure to act fraudulently. Prior
research has focused on the incentives/pressures and opportunity elements of triangle (Dechow et
8

al., 1996; Lie, 2005; Rosner, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2003; Collins et al., 2009). However, the
rationalization element did not receive as much focus in the literature (Hogan et al., 2008; Murphy
& Dacin, 2011). In fact, Trompeter et al. (2013) identifies the study of rationalization as an open
area for future research, which provides motivation for this study. Rationalization is a mental
process that allows an individual to justify his/her problematic behavior (Sloane, 1944; Fointiat,
1998). The justification of problematic behavior reduces the negative affect related to the act,
which as result encourages unethical behavior, but in order for an individual to successfully
rationalize a bad act he/she must believe their own rationalization to be true (Kunda, 1990). This
research expands understanding of distancing may impact rationalization in the commission of
occupational fraud.
2.2 Ethical Distancing
Jones (1991) and Moberg & Seabright (2000) look at moral reasoning while focusing on
how psychologically connected actors are to the outcome of their actions. The authors divide
behavior into three components, the person committing the act, the action itself, and the outcome
or result of the behavior. The stronger the perceived connection between the components, the more
ethical a person will be. For example, Kaufmann et al. (2005) looks at how bad actors reduce the
connection to the outcome when behaving unethically and posit that actors can create ethical
distancing. This is achievable in several ways, one of which involves the comparison of the wrong
act to a more wrong alternative act. For example, the actor might agree that stealing is wrong but
still steals under the rationalization that he could have done something else that is much worse,
such as committing murder. Within the context of this proposal, an actor might rationalize stealing
when done through a computer system because it may not be as bad as physically stealing money.
Neutralization is a concept somewhat similar to rationalization, in that the more capable a person
9

is of neutralizing the perception that he/she violated a social norm the more likely he/she will
behave unethically (Sykes & Matza, 1957). The remote-working environment creates distancing
as compared to an in-person working environment, which then in turn may aid in rationalization.
Guragai et al. (2017) summarizes research related to the intersection between Accounting
Information Systems (AIS) and ethics, and calls attention to gaps in the literature, arguing that the
interaction between people and AIS presents a risk of unethical behavior. The existence of a system
may cloud an accountant’s awareness or even how they evaluate an event as being wrong or right
(Hannan et al., 2006). In addition, digital systems or certain technologies may encourage unethical
behavior by giving the actors the ability to distance themselves from their actions (Guragai et al.,
2017), which may reduce the perpetrator’s perceived personal responsibility and enables
neutralization.
2.3 Construal Level Theory
Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) centers on how mental representations
(perception, comprehension, interpretations) of an object or event is affected by how
psychologically distant an individual is from that object or event. The more distant the more
abstract the mental representation, and the less distant the more precise and specific the
representation (Liberman & Trope, 2008). In fact, Gamliel et al. (2016) found that in a US sample,
in a high utility context, unethical behavioral intentions were higher in the low-construal level
compared to the high-construal level, meaning that the abstract representation presented more
ethical intentions and the more concrete representation presented less ethical intentions. However,
the paper does not expand further to look beyond intentions and into actions. Relatedly, higher
construal levels have a positive effect on self-control (S. Alper, 2019), which was shown to
increase resistance to cheating temptations (Mead et al., 2009) and more ethical behavior (Rua et
10

al., 2016). In addition, experimental research demonstrated that high construal levels decreased
preference of immediate and small rewards (Fujita et al., 2006). Therefore, higher-level construal
is expected to decrease unethical behavior through higher self-control. However, Zuckerman et al.
(1981) suggested that ethical behavior is a natural response, and that unethical behavior requires
more self-control. This was further supported by recent empirical research, showing that
individuals under time pressure were more honest because they did not have enough time to control
their natural honest behavior and behave dishonestly instead (Capraro, 2017). Similarly, Veer et
al. (2014) found that deception was lower when subjects were experiencing higher cognitive load,
which suggests that honest behavior is more natural and less draining than dishonest behavior.
Furthermore, low construal level was found to lead to better moral judgments than higher construal
levels (Gong & Medin, 2012). Based on that, higher Construal levels can lead to unethical behavior
instead. A gap in the literature remains, and an empirically supported explanation for the
differences in the findings of previous research is still absent (Alper, 2019).
The theory of ethical distancing suggests that the more psychologically distant a person is
from the action or its consequences the more likely the person will behave unethically. Conversely,
though, Construal Level Theory suggests that the more distant a person is the more abstractly
he/she will perceive the situation and hence behave more ethically. These conflicting potential
outcomes are of particular interest to this proposal. Since the literature is divided and the theories
suggest outcomes in opposite directions, I state my first hypothesis in the null as follows:
H1: Psychological distance will have no effect on ethical behavior.
2.4 Moderating Effect of Attachment/Familiarity to Technology
Reber et al. (1998) and Laham et al. (2012) found that individuals tend to rate a stimulus
more positively if it was easily processed. Individuals are seduced by conclusions that are easily
11

made compared to conclusions that require more effort (Alter, 2013). However, processing
disfluency can also lead individuals to process information more carefully and take more abstract
perspective (Alter, 2013). In addition, processing fluency can affect judgment in two ways: One,
when individuals use naïve theories to draw a relationship between fluency and the stimuli
presented (Schwarz, 2004); and two, based on the hedonic marking hypothesis, when individuals
utilize the positive affect caused by fluency in making judgments (Winkielman et al., 2003). The
high processing fluency signals that a stimulus has been encountered before, which results in a
more positive feeling compared to an unknown stimulus, which is correlated with fear of the
unknown (Winkielman et al., 2003; Hill, 1978). Reber et al. (1998) show that higher fluency
resulted in a stimulus being evaluated more positively. If the hedonic marking hypothesis is true,
then fluency will result in unethical behavior being judged less wrongly. However, if the naïve
theory is true then fluency will result in unethical behavior being judged more wrongly (Laham et
al., 2009). The moral judgment of an individual will affect his/her behavior. For example, if an act
is judged as unethical an individual is less likely to do it. Since the two theories offer opposing
predictions, I hypothesize a moderating effect of technology attachment as more attached
individuals will be more fluent in processing online material, but I do not hypothesize a direction
for the moderation, because the direction of the moderation is dependent on the direction of the
results in H1. For example, if psychological distance had a negative or positive effect on ethical
behavior then technology attachment will moderate the relationship such that those who are more
attached to technology will not differ based on psychological distance, whereas those who are less
attached to technology will be affect be psychological distance (either negatively or positively
based on H1). Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows:
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H2: The effect of psychological distance on ethical behavior is moderated by attachment
to technology, specifically either individuals that are more (less) attached to technology will
behave more (less) ethically when they are psychologically distant or vice versa.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
3.0 METHODOLGY:
Below I present the design, participants, experiment procedures/task, independent and dependent
variables for the experiment.
3.1 Design
The experiment utilized a 2 (dice task: online versus real die) x 2 (cash task: cash picture
versus no cash picture) between-participants design. The study manipulated psychological
distance between high and low where the real die and the cash picture represent the low distance
and the online die and cash number represent the high distance. In addition, attachment to
technology was also measured to test for moderation.
3.2 Participants
With the current coronavirus pandemic, utilizing an online platform was more feasible than
an actual in-person lab experiment, and therefore participants were recruited online from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Subjects for this experiment examined a common fraud which may be
experienced by anyone, eliminating the necessity to limit the sample to accounting professionals.
Ninety-six participants (out of a desired one hundred) completed part 1 of the pilot study that
involved the demographic and different measures, such as in-person/social interaction, trust in
technology and attachment to technology. After part 1, forty participants returned a week later to
complete part 2 of the study that included the simulation with the dice and cash tasks plus the post
13

experiment questionnaire. Preliminary analysis proved informative. Based on the feedback from
the pilot study, changes were made such as the reduction of several items from the in-person/social
interaction scale, trust in technology scale, and time spent on technology scale. In addition, the
study was no longer divided into two separate components and instead completed the entire
instrument in one study.
A total of 293 participants completed the survey and after removing participants that failed
several checks, straight-liners1, and those who did not follow instructions the final sample size was
228. Adding the pilot sample would have increased the total sample size to 266 participants, but
the analysis was conducted without including the pilot sample to eliminate a potential confound.
The sample was made up of M-Turk participants that own iPhones. This is due to the
measurement of the independent variables (technology attachment), which is currently available
on the Apple product. iPhones have a built-in feature that shows you how much you have been
using your phone and gives you a weekly average with details on how long each application was
used (see figure 4.3 below for an example). Other phones that utilize other systems, such as
Android, either do not have the built-in feature or provides different information that is not easily
comparable between systems, and therefore such data would be difficult to identify with noniPhone users. This also eliminates a potential confound, which is the possibility of results being
driven by different phone users rather than the manipulation. In other words, in a sample with
iPhone and Samsung phone users, one might say the results are due because these two groups are
causing the difference, but in this case since the sample is made up of only iPhone users then the
results cannot be due to different groups of phone brand users. Research looking at differences

1

Straight-liners are individuals that provide the same answer again and again in a survey. For example, if a survey
has 6 questions that ask the participants to rate something from one to seven, a straight-liner is someone who would
answer the same each time (e.g., six), which creates a straight vertical line down the survey if we were to plot it.
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between iPhone and Android users has shown conflicting results. On one hand, Gotz et al. (2017)
found no significant differences in personality traits between users, while on the other hand, Shaw
et al. (2016) found that there are differences between users. One important difference was that
iPhone users were shown to have lower levels of honesty and humility.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
The attention and manipulation checks are discussed in the tasks section below. Following
Simer (2020), I used checks that are specific to the task for comprehension. Further, built-in filters
were utilized to reduce the number of Super-Turkers2. Such filters include requiring participants
to have a high approval rate (greater than 97%), removing straight liners (Cook, 2020), and limiting
the number of surveys performed. Straight liners are those who answer all questions the same,
such as clicking on the highest value for all Likert scale questions. Buchheit et al. (2018) and
Buhrmester et al. (2018) have used similar filters and checks. Lastly, the M-Turk sample is limited
to the US as it is the population of interest in this study, and the U.S. M-Turk sample has lower
error rate compared to an International M-Turk sample (Steelman et al, 2014; Smith et al., 2016).
An attention check was used asking participants to choose their favorite color from a list of 8 colors
(red, orange, yellow, blue, green, grey, black, and violet), but were specifically given a note right
under the question telling the participants to choose one specific color (grey), regardless if it was
their favorite color or not, to see if they are paying attention or just doing the survey quickly. In
addition, a manipulation check was used for the dice task where participants that utilized a real die
were asked to take a picture of the die in their hand before the task started. At the end, the
participants are asked if they used a real or online die. A portion of the real dice group uploaded

2

Super-Turkers are individuals that earn a lot of money via Mturk by completing many surveys and are usually very
fast when participating in a study.
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fake pictures that were downloaded from the internet as revealed by a google image search, and
those were removed as mentioned above.
Participants earned a base amount of $1 for participating in the experiment, which took
them an average of twenty-four minutes. Participants earned an average of $2.06 in the study.
Buhrmester et al. (2016) found that a compensation of $0.50 resulted in an average of 30 to 40
surveys submitted per hour for studies that took between five to ten minutes. In addition, Casler et
al. (2013) paid M-Turkers $0.50 for a 10–12-minute task, which was a high rate of pay compared
to similar task at that time. More recent studies have paid more than previously but are still within
the range paid in this study. For example, Reiter (2020) paid Turkers a flat fee of $1 for a 10–15minute study and Simer (2020) paid $2, therefore the current payout in this study ranging between
$1-$3.00 is within and higher than the current norm. Participants also have the chance to earn
additional reward based on how they perform. Specifically, the bonus is determined by how much
the participants report in their dice rolling task and how much they misreport the cash reporting
task. The most unethical participant would receive a total of $3 made up of the $1 fixed fee, plus
$1.50 if he/she rolled sixes in each period and $0.50 if the participant decided to misreport and
“steal” all the cash.
3.3 Experiment Procedures and Task
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Participants started by clicking on the Qualtrics link presented on M-Turk. Once they got
in Qualtrics they read a cover letter asking them to participate. Then participants were asked to
answer demographic information and additional questions for variables of interest to this study.
These questions gathered the following information: age, gender, work experience in years,
education level, in-person/social interaction, trust in technology, technology use (self-reported)
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and the extent of mobile usage by uploading a screenshot of the screen report available in their
iPhone’s settings. Instructions on how to make a screenshot and where to find the screen report
were provided to make sure all participants know how to take the screenshots and upload them
on the computer. The self-reported technology use included six items. The measures are as
follows: Approximately how many hours per week do you spend on each of the following
activities (1) Using the internet for work or school purposes, (2) Using the internet for other than
work/school (e.g. emailing, shopping, searching, downloading/ watching music, movies etc.) (3)
Playing electronic games on a computer, TV, phone, or other device, (4) Texting on a cell phone,
(5) Visiting social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, etc., (6) Video
chatting (Skype, Zoom, Facetime, etc.). These items are all continuous and are partially adopted
from Twenge et al. (2018), except for item 1. Furthermore, multiple items were used to measure
the construct “In-person social interaction”, because individuals that spend more time on the
screen will spend less time engaging in social interaction, but individuals might be spending their
non-screen hours differently, and so measuring and controlling for social interaction can
eliminate a confound that the effect is due to differences in non-screen hours. The items are as
follows: (1) How often do you get together with friends, informally? (2) How often do you go to
parties or other social affairs? (3) How often do you go to the shopping mall? (4) How often do
you go out for fun and recreation during a regular week? (5) How often do you go out on a date?
These items are measured with a 7-point scale ranging from never to everyday and are adopted
from Twenge et al. (2018). In addition, participants were also asked if their answers would be
any different if they were doing the survey before the COVID pandemic.
Afterwards, participants were presented with details on the tasks they will be performing
and how the reward is calculated. M-Turk participants were asked to assume the role of
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employees in a hypothetical company where they have two main tasks to perform. The first task
involves rolling a die (online die versus real die) and reporting the number they got on each roll
for five periods. The online die group is the more distant and the real die is the less distant,
psychologically. The compensation was based on the dice rolls reported with higher numbers
resulting in higher compensation. Statistically the average dice roll should be 3.5 in any given
period (or 17.5 for five periods). This task was utilized to allow the participants to do something
that was not directly monitored by Qualtrics and hence make the participants more comfortable
to behave as they will. The second task was the cash reporting task, which involved reporting
and safe keeping of cash. Participants were divided into two groups; one group was presented
with just a number indicating how much cash is in the safe box in a given period (high
psychological distance) and the other group was presented with pictures of the cash in the safe
box before reporting (low psychological distance). The dice and cash task were both done for
five periods, but participants did not know the number of periods in the experiment to prevent
any bias in final reporting-period behavior. The periods are designed to provide more realism as
employees usually work in companies for several periods. The high psychological distance group
did not have the cash pictures but instead had participants click on a box that revealed how much
cash is available in each period and then asked to report the cash available. I am using this
variable because I am interested in unethical behavior and this task presents participants with a
choice to be ethical (i.e., correctly reporting the amount of cash and not gaining any additional
reward) versus a choice to be unethical (i.e., misreporting less cash to get more rewards). In
addition, it also provides a continuous measure instead of dichotomously dividing participants
between ethical and unethical. Unlike the dice task, the cash task is monitored, and hence
unethical participants can be identified with more certainty. Total reward was a fixed $1 fee for
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participating plus the amount dice rolls reported and cash misreported after the conversion rate is
applied. The conversion for the dice task was as follows: one unit equals $0.05, and the
conversion rate for the cash task is as follows: $10 game money equals $0.05 actual US Dollars.
The total cash in all five periods together is equal to $100 in game money, but each period did
not have $20 (they are not evenly spread) so that the task is more realistic. For example, period 1
showed $26, period 2 showed $4, period 3 showed $17, period 4 showed $31 and period 5
showed $22, making the total $100 in game money. Based on that, the highest bonus the most
unethical participant could earn is $0.50 USD, which will only happen if they reported a zero
amount in every period instead of reporting the truthful amount. The incentive to misreport is the
bonus payout above the $1 fixed fee and dice reward, because unless the participants misreport,
they cannot get more than the $1 fixed fees plus the dice roll amount reported (which on average
should be 17.5 equivalent to $0.875). The post experiment questionnaire is the same for both
groups.
After completing the task participants filled out the post-experiment questionnaire. The
questionnaire provided insights on which theory CLT versus Ethical Distancing has a stronger role
in affecting participants behaviors. To measure CLT levels the Behavioral Identification Form
(BIF) was used, which includes twenty-five dichotomous items (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).
Ethical Distancing was measured by utilizing eleven items that were created based on the
Kaufmann et al. (2005) research paper. In addition, the post-experiment questionnaire also
provided insight on to whether technology was perceived to have a distancing effect or not. The
items that were used are as follows: (1) Rate how psychologically difficult it is to physically steal
cash in person. (2) Rate how psychologically difficult it is to steal cash via a computer system.
Items (1) and (2) utilized a 7-point scale from extremely easy to extremely difficult. Item (3) asked
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how ethical it is to physically steal cash in person and item (4) asked how ethical it is to steal cash
via a computer system. Items (3) and (4) utilized a 7-point scale from very unethical to very ethical.
Lastly, the post experiment questionnaire also included manipulation and attention checks to filter
out participants as mentioned earlier.
3.4 Independent Variables
Psychological Distance
Psychological distance is operationalized using a real die and pictures of cash. Specifically,
I manipulated psychological distance in two ways: real versus online dice, and with versus without
a picture of cash. In the picture participants saw different cash denominations a flat surface next
to each other. The without picture group did not see such pictures, but rather only saw a number
on the screen representing the cash present. Two different measures of psychological distance were
used (CLT and Ethical Distancing measures) as mentioned above to see which psychological
distance plays a stronger role in ethical behavior within the tasks in this study.
Fujita et al. (2006) used videos to manipulate spacial distance to affect the level of construal
applied by participants. Specifically, the authors informed one group of participants that the video
was recorded in a near location and the other group were told that the video was recorded in a very
far location. In addition, Bar-Anan et al (2006) finds further support that construal levels are forms
of psychological distance by utilizing four experiments that manipulated construal levels via
distinct/exemplar words for the low construal group and abstract/categorical words for the high
construal group. Therefore, within the context of this study, the without picture group represents
the more distant scenario, whereas the with picture group represents a less distant scenario, because
visually seeing the cash in the picture represents are more distinct/exemplar representation of cash
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compared to the without picture which just presents a number on a screen (a more abstract
representation).
Attachment to Technology
Attachment to Technology is operationalized by using the screen time report available in
iPhones. Specifically, participants took a screenshot of the iPhone’s screen time report, a feature
unique to the Apple product. This is a new measure introduced in this study as previous studies
utilized self-reported measures based on how much time the participants think they spend using
different technologies (Twenge et al., 2018).
3.5 Dependent Variables
The study measured two dependent variables: Total dice amount reported, and total
amount of cash reported. In addition, the time to perform both tasks was measured. Since I am
interested in measuring how attachment to technology interacts with psychological distance to
affect ethical behavior, the dice amount provides some insight as amounts that are higher than
average could indicate unethical behavior. Moreover, the amount of cash reported provides a better
proxy measure of unethical behavior. If a participant reported truthfully then the amount reported
will be $100, but if the participants was unethical and misreported to gain higher rewards then the
cash reported will be less than $100. This variable is also dichotomized based on whether a
participant stole cash or not. In addition, the use of time taken to report the dice and cash follows
Capraro (2017) who found that time constraints resulted in more ethical behavior because unethical
behavior that results in higher rewards requires more deliberate thinking that requires more time.
I interpret this as participants who choose to behave unethically will spend more time to report the
dice roll and the experimental discrepancy in cash. The cash task only measures ethical behavior.
If misreporting results in cognitive dissonance, then those participants will spend more time to
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misreport the numbers. Finally, the last dependent variable is total compensation calculated as a
function of adding both the compensation from the dice task and the cash task. The higher the total
compensation the more unethical the participant behaved.
3.6 Control Variables
To rule out alternative explanations to the results several control variables were included.
First, gender was included because prior literature has shown that females are more ethical (Franke
et al., 1997), conservative, and risk averse (Palvia et al., 2015) than men. In addition, age was also
included because prior research has shown that older individuals are more ethical (Peterson et al.,
2001; Deshpande, 1997) and risk averse (Albert & Duffy, 2012) than younger ones. Both gender
and age were included as controls in Holderness et al. (2017). Furthermore, education level was
measured because individuals with higher levels of education show higher ethical standards than
those with lower levels of education (Deshpande, 1997). Lastly, work experience in years was the
last covariate included.

4.0 ANALYSIS / RESULTS
4.1 Main Analysis Results
To test for H1 several analyses were conducted looking at 3 different dependent variables
(total dice, total cash, and total compensation). In univariate analysis with total dice as the
dependent variable and dice group as the predictor results show a significant positive main effect
(coefficient=1.30, p-value 0.027, two-tailed). This means that those who were in the real dice
group reported a significantly higher total dice amount and hence were less ethical. To identify if
the results were due to the manipulation affecting the CLT or ethical distancing additional analysis
was conducted with dice group as the predictor, once with CLT as the dependent variable and once
with the ethical distancing scale as the dependent variable. However, both analyses were not
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significant. This could be due to one of several reasons, (1) the manipulation did not affect
psychological distance, (2) the manipulation did not affect the measure of psychological distance
that was used, or (3) because CLT and ethical distancing measures were collected after the
participants was exposed to both the dice and cash manipulations, the manipulations might have
interacted. Further analysis was conducted including both manipulations (dice and cash) as
predictors including the interaction between the two. When CLT scale was the dependent variable
results showed a positive but non-significant interaction effect (coefficient=0.23, p-value=0.145,
two-tailed). When ethical distancing scale was the dependent variable results were similar in that
the interaction was also non-significant and hence did not have a distancing effect This means that
the interaction between the manipulations was not the reason for non-significant distancing effect,
but rather it could be either that the manipulation did not affect psychological distance, was not
strong enough, or did not affect the specific measures used. Future studies could utilize different
measures of psychological distance or stronger manipulation to get a better idea on how the
manipulation affects psychological distance in both CLT and ethical distancing, and hence provide
a better understanding of how psychological distance affects ethical behavior. Also, future studies
can utilize one manipulation per study instead of two manipulations to reduce complexity.
Additionally, mediation analysis was performed to see if the dice manipulation might have had an
indirect effect on psychological distance via total dice. Mediation results show that the dice
manipulation had a significant indirect effect on ethical distancing but did not have an effect on
CLT.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]

Moving on to analyze the second dependent variable, total cash reported, an OLS
regression was performed with two predictors; the cash group and the total dice reported from the
23

dice task. Results show a moderately significant negative interaction effect (coefficient=-1.66, pvalue=0.063, two-tailed), which means those who were in the cash picture group reported
significantly less cash as total dice reported increased, whereas those in the no cash picture group
did not differ in total cash reported as total dice reported increased. Further analysis was performed
to investigate if the results were due to distancing in CLT or ethical distancing theory. The analysis
was run twice (once with CLT as the dependent variable and again with ethical distancing scale as
the dependent variable). CLT analysis was not significant, but the ethical distancing analysis
revealed significant positive main effect for total dice, which means those who reported a higher
dice amount were more distant. In addition, those in the cash picture group were less distant but
the effect was close to moderate significance (p-value=0.105, two-tailed). This could provide
support to the argument that the manipulation was not strong enough but does indeed have an
effect on psychological distance.
To test for H2 several analyses were performed. First, since the study included two
manipulations and the analysis for H2 looks at the moderating effect of technology attachment,
which means the analysis will include a 3-way interaction, I wanted to simplify the analysis and
break it down to a 2-way analysis that presents an overall picture of the results. To do so I created
a dichotomous variable “real” which is equal to 1 if the participant was presented with both a real
die and a cash picture, and zero if the participant was presented with both an online dice and the
no picture cash group. This simplifies the analysis as it divides the sample into two groups (real
versus online) instead of having four groups. However, this also means that a portion of the sample
is lost, specifically those who were once in a real manipulation and once in an online one, such as
being first in an online dice group and then in a cash group (more real) group. An OLS regression
was performed with total compensation as the dependent variable and two predictors: “real” and
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iPhone screen time (n=124). Results show a moderately negative interaction (coefficient=-0.10, pvalue 0.087, two-tailed). This shows that those who were tech savvy and exposed to real
manipulations were compensated less and hence more ethical than those who are tech savvy but
had online manipulations, whereas those who are not tech savvy did not differ. This provides
support for technology attachment having a moderating effect, but it seems to moderate the
relationship in a different way than hypothesized. For example, instead of making tech savvy
individuals more ethical in a psychologically distant situation it seems that tech savvy individuals
are more ethical in less distant situations compared to those who are not tech savvy. These results
could also be explained by media richness theory (Daft & Lengal, 1986), which posits that media
richness can improve performance. While face-to-face is seen as the richest media channel, the
results in this study might imply that for tech savvy individuals the richness of the channels is
higher compared to others that are less familiar to technology, and therefore the manipulations that
are more real might be more real for tech people, which could be why we see them acting more
ethically compared to others that are not tech familiar. In hindsight it would have been better to
run several studies separately with each manipulation alone so that observations are not lost, and
to make the analysis and results interpretation simpler compared to having a 3-way interaction.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
[Insert Figure 6 Here]

4.2 Additional Analysis Results
Results show that ethical distancing theory seems to play a role in unethical behavior as
seen with higher compensations (more unethical behavior) resulting in higher scores on the ethical
distancing scale, but why don’t we see any results with CLT? Could it be that CLT, as measured
in this study, plays a role before the fact as a neutralization mechanism, whereas ethical distancing
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plays a role after the fact as rationalization mechanism. To further investigate this possibility an
OLS regression was performed with total cash as the dependent variable and two predictors (cash
group and the residuals of CLT). Since the CLT measure was collected in the post experiment
questionnaire it could have been affected by any one of the variables collected prior to the CLT
measure. Therefore, the model to calculate the residuals included all the variables prior to the CLT
measures. If CLT was collected at the beginning of the experiment I would have used the raw CLT
score instead. Results show a significant positive interaction (coefficient=15.79, p-value=0.033,
two-tailed). Results were qualitatively similar in a logistic regression including “stole cash” as the
dichotomous dependent variable instead. This indicates that those who were more psychologically
distant via CLT were more ethical when presented with a cash picture compared to the no cash
picture group who were more unethical as psychological distance increased. However, when the
same analysis was performed with the residuals of the ethical distancing scale no significant effects
were observed. The results shed more light on the possibility that both CLT and ethical distancing
could be playing a role but in different ways. For example, CLT might be playing a stronger role
before the act as a neutralization technique and ethical distancing might be playing a role after the
fact as a rationalization mechanism to reduce cognitive dissonance.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
[Insert Table 3 Here]
[Insert Figure 7 Here]

5.0 DISCUSSION
5.1 General Discussion
In a study that looks at the moderating role of attachment to technology on the relationship
between psychological distance and unethical behavior, I first find some support for a positive
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relationship between psychological distance and unethical behavior, and that attachment to
technology does have a moderating effect on the relationship. However, while results show that
ethical distancing theory plays a strong role, I am unable to eliminate CLT as another important
factor that plays a different role as shown in the additional analysis section.
The results have important implications in terms of today’s business world that have
become more online post COVID. It might be wiser for employers to hire more tech-savvy people
not just for their tech abilities but also for their ethical behavior. In addition, untabulated analysis
that look at how being affected by COVID in terms of in-person interaction and screentime usage
also affected individuals’ ethical behavior, which also poses the important question if such COVID
effects will dissipate after COVID is over and everything goes back to normal. If effects are longer
lasting then those affected may need an intervention to bring them back to normal and make them
behave more ethically.
5.2 Limitations
As with any lab experiment the study suffers from lack of ecological validity, and therefore
I acknowledge that it may impact external validity. I cannot say for certain that individuals will
behave the same way in the real world when performing real tasks for their employers. However,
the fictitious currency used does add to realism to a certain extent. In addition, the study is limited
as it uses a sample that only use iPhones. This is a limitation because the results might not
generalize to non-iPhone users should any significant differences exist between such groups. Also,
M-Turk suffers from self-selection as participants self-select which study in which to participate.
This might bias the results as it might not be representative of the entire M-Turk population and
the non-M-Turk population. Moreover, the experiment does not involve a feature whereby
participants could get caught, which also reduces realism. In other words, participants might
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behave differently if a possible audit was included as part of the procedures as you would expect
to find in real life. Lastly, the M-Turk sample used is located in the US, which also limits our
ability to generalize to other populations not in the US.
5.3 Contributions
This research has important practical implications. First, technology is becoming an
important part of everyday life. In addition, Generation Z (individuals born in 1996 and later) have
been exposed to more technology since birth (Dimock, 2019) and are more attached than previous
generations with almost 50% reporting that they are constantly online throughout the day
(Anderson & Jiang, 2018). This study shows that the increased use of technology has an effect on
ethical behavior. In addition, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has shifted many aspects of everyday
life to an online (no physical contact) environment, and this study shows that those affected by the
pandemic on a social level behaved unethically as a result. Knowing how the new workforce might
differ than previous workers will provide more insight to employers regarding types of internal
controls to be used. In addition, the study extends research in the fields of psychology, fraud, and
forensic accounting.
5.4 Future Research
Future research can utilize different designs, include additional psychological distance
measures and possible add measures related to Media Richness Theory. Specifically, with the
manipulations it might be better to include only one manipulation (either dice, the cash task, or
any other appropriate task) instead of two manipulations together. In addition, another design can
include the psychological distance measures (CLT and ethical distancing) at the beginning of the
study before the manipulations and tasks to explore if there is further support to what was found
in the additional analyses. In addition, future studies could use different manipulation checks to
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see if the manipulations affected psychological distance, without having participants perform a
simulation, before running the experiment with the manipulations and tasks together. Lastly, as
media richness might be playing a role it is worth adding measures to see if that is true. This will
also further contribute the literature that combines fraud with communication.
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Appendix:
Figure 13:
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This figure demonstrates how the two theories predict ethical behavior as psychological distance increases. For
example, in terms of ethical distancing theory (the right part of figure 1), we have the act itself in the center and as
psychological distance increases the theory predicts less ethical behavior, whereas on the left side we have CLT
predicting more ethical behavior as psychological distance from the act increases.
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Figure 3:
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33

Figure 5:
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Figure 6: Moderating effect of technology attachment (moderator=screentime) on the
relationship between psychological distance (IV=real) and ethical behavior (DV=total
compensation)
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Figure 7: Moderating effect of CLT (residuals) on the relationship between psychological
distance (IV=cash group) and ethical behavior (DV=total cash & stole cash)
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Table 1:
H1
(4)
total_cash

(5)
clt_scale

(6)
ethdist_scale

cash_group

2.196
(3.828)

0.0512
(0.0748)

-0.134
(0.0822)

centered_total_dice

-1.334**
(0.626)

0.00278
(0.0122)

0.0407***
(0.0134)

cash_group*centered_total_dice

-1.656*
(0.887)

-0.00278
(0.0173)

-0.00304
(0.0191)

dice_group

H1
(1)
total_dice

(2)
clt_scale

(3)
ethdist_scale

1.299**
(0.584)

0.0267
(0.0766)

-0.0207
(0.0878)

H2
(7)
actual_comp

real

0.0496
(0.0539)

z_totalscreentime

0.0163
(0.0401)

real*z_totalscreentime

-0.100*
(0.0582)

_cons
N
R2

18.76***
(0.361)
228
0.021

-0.0159
(0.0473)
228
0.001

0.00903
(0.0542)
228
0.000

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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80.57***
(2.742)
228
0.109

-0.0320
(0.0535)
228
0.002

0.0694
(0.0589)
228
0.080

1.033***
(0.0341)
124
0.042

Table 1 includes 7 OLS regression models. The first row includes the dependent variables for each model, and the first column includes the independent
variables.
Dependent variables: (1) total_dice is the sum of amount reported in the dice task after each die roll. (2) clt_scale represents the CLT score for each participant,
higher CLT means higher psychological distance. (3) ethdist_scale represents the ethical distancing score for each participant, higher scores mean higher
psychological distance. (4) total_cash is the sum of the cash reported in the cash task, higher cash amount reported represents more ethical behavior. (7)
actual_compensation is the total compensation earned for participating in the study, higher compensation means more unethical behavior/reporting.
Independent variables: dice_group is a dichotomous manipulated variable for the type of dice used in the dice task (0 = online dice, 1 = real dice). Cash_group is
a dichotomous manipulated variable for the type of cash seen in the cash task (0 = no cash picture presented, 1 = with cash picture presented).
Centered_total_dice is the same the dependent variable (1) total_dice after centering. Real is a dichotomous variable for the type of dice used in the dice task and
the type of cash seen in the cash task (0 = online dice and without cash picture present, 1 = real dice and with cash picture present). Z_totalscreentime is the
standardized score based on the iPhone screen time reported in hours.
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Table 2:

total_dice

(1)
clt_scale
0.00141
(0.00863)

total_cash

(2)
clt_scale

N
R2

(4)
ethdist_scale
0.0392***
(0.00954)

(5)
ethdist_scale

0.884***
(0.130)

0.0353
(0.124)
-0.0329
(0.170)
228
0.000

0.0271
(0.107)
228
0.000

(6)
ethdist_scale

-0.00928***
(0.00126)

-0.000402
(0.00123)

actual_compensation

_cons

(3)
clt_scale

-0.0430
(0.136)
228
0.000

-0.754***
(0.188)
228
0.069

0.759***
(0.110)
228
0.193

-0.931***
(0.142)
228
0.170

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2 includes 6 OLS regression models. The first row includes the dependent variables for each model, and the first column includes the independent
variables.
Dependent variables: (1) clt_scale represents the CLT score for each participant, higher CLT means higher psychological distance. (4) ethdist_scale represents
the ethical distancing score for each participant, higher scores mean higher psychological distance.
Independent variables: total_dice is the sum of amount reported in the dice task after each die roll. total_cash is the sum of the cash reported in the cash task,
higher cash amount reported represents more ethical behavior. actual_compensation is the total compensation earned for participating in the study, higher
compensation means more unethical behavior/reporting.
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Table 3:
(1)
total_cash

(2)
stole_cash

(3)
total_cash

(4)
stole_cash

cash_group

2.133
(4.013)

-0.141
(0.275)

2.133
(4.049)

-0.106
(0.281)

cltresid

-7.397
(5.042)

0.473
(0.344)

cash_group*cltresid

15.80**
(7.369)

-1.342***
(0.514)

ethdistresid

-2.707
(5.541)

1.305***
(0.412)

cash_group*ethdistresid

5.340
(7.782)

-0.508
(0.562)

80.57***
(2.901)
228
0.003

-0.344*
(0.203)
228
0.052

_cons
N
R2

80.57***
(2.874)
228
0.021

-0.314
(0.194)
228
0.025

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3 includes 2 OLS regression models and two logistic regression models. The first row includes the dependent
variables for each model, and the first column includes the independent variables.
Dependent variables: (1) total_cash is the sum of the cash reported in the cash task, higher cash amount reported
represents more ethical behavior. (2) stole_cash is a dichotomous variable (0 = did not steal cash, 1 = did steal cash)
Independent variables: Cash_group is a dichotomous manipulated variable for the type of cash seen in the cash task
(0 = no cash picture presented, 1 = with cash picture presented). cltresid represents the residual of the CLT score for
each participant after including it in a model with all the variables measured in the study, higher CLT means higher
psychological distance. ethdistresid represents the residual of the ethical distancing score for each participant after
including it in a model with all the variables measured in the study, higher scores mean higher psychological
distance.

40

CHAPTER THREE: WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK: THEORY AND
EXPERIMENTATION OF FACTORS REGARDING FRAUD TIPSTERS

A. Scott Fleming
John Chambers College of Business and Economics
West Virginia University
Scott.Fleming@mail.wvu.edu

D. Kip Holderness, Jr
John Chambers College of Business and Economics
West Virginia University
Kip.Holderness@mail.wvu.edu

Richard A. Riley, Jr
John Chambers College of Business and Economics
West Virginia University
Richard.riley@mail.wvu.edu

Ali A. Al Hasan
John Chambers College of Business and Economics
West Virginia University
aaa0066@mix.wvu.edu

41

Abstract
This study uses an experiment to investigate whether financial incentives, in combination
with certain behavioral factors, induce some individuals to delay reporting an occupational fraud.
Further, this study introduces a new theory of whistle blowing that captures these factors. Our
findings suggest that while many subjects report fraud immediately, some factors lead subjects to
delay reporting in order to maximize financial benefits. Other factors associated with whistle
blowing delay include personal characteristics such as individual self-ethics, narcissism; and
organizational factors such as perceived ethics of other employees.

Key words: whistleblowing, financial incentives, altruism, narcissism, framing
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1.0 Introduction
Occupational fraud is a high cost of doing business and can have a very negative impact
on revenues for a typical organization (ACFE 2020). Fortunately for the capital markets,
management and corporate financial executives, audit committees, and auditors, the actions of the
whistle blower aid in the discovery of such fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE) estimates that a whistle blower may be involved in more than 40% of frauds reported
(ACFE 2020). Therefore, we note the obvious that the role of the whistle blower is an important
function in the markets and is particularly important to the accounting profession.
Our insights into the characteristics of the whistle blower are still developing. This study
serves to add to the literature in two primary aspects. First, we introduce a new theoretical structure
and model to describe the behavioral antecedents of the decision to whistle blow. Second, we use
an experiment to test our model and identify which components may influence whistle blowing
outcomes when financial incentives for whistleblowing is present. In other words, the study sheds
light into what factors, both external and internal, play a role in either deciding to blow the whistle
or delaying the action of whistleblowing to reap additional financial rewards. This is very relevant
given the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
In this experiment we find that the new model generally holds and that factors such as
narcissism and the perceived ethical level of the average employee and of the self, impact when a
tipster is likely to whistle blow.
This paper proceeds in the following fashion. Section 2 presents the theory and develops
the hypotheses, Section 3 explains the methodology, Section 4 covers the results, and Section 5
contains our conclusion.
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2.0 Theory & Hypothesis
2.1 Whistle Blowing
Whistle blowing is the reporting of perceived wrongdoing in an organization (Victor et al.
1993). Near and Miceli (1985) describe whistleblowing as a four-element process of the disclosure
of alleged illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices which include the whistle blower, the alleged
act, the alleged participant, and the organization. Researchers have examined various situational
and dispositional characteristics of whistle blowers (e.g., Dozier and Miceli 1985; Borg 2000;
Bjorkelo et al. 2010; Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe 2010; Seifert et al. 2013; Kaplan et al. 2010) in
an attempt to understand and predict the behavior.
While research on whistle blowing has advanced, questions still remain as to behavioral
aspects of the whistle blower (Trompeter et al. 2014). In fact, prior research has focused more on
the fraud perpetrator compared to other components such as the whistleblower, investigator, etc.
(Free & Murphy, 2015). Other research has looked at discovery and reporting of fraud (DeZoort
& Harrison, 2018; Berger et al., 2017) and factors that affect the recipient of a whistleblower tip
(e.g., internal auditors) in deciding whether to start the pre-predication process (Kerler et al., 2021).
In addition, within whistleblowing, researchers have looked at how prosocial qualities (Dozier &
Miceli, 1985), morality and Machiavellianism (Dalton & Radtke, 2013), compensation/rewards
for reporting (Brink et al., 2013; Scheetz & Wall, 2019), and retaliation (Young, 2017) can play a
role in the whistleblowers’ decision to report the fraud. However, to our knowledge no research
examines how the tone of the firm via its code of conduct and how personal traits of the
whistleblower such as individuals’ narcissism, altruism, etc., play a role in making the decision to
report a fraud, especially when there is reward or financial compensation for those who do decide
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to report. Therefore, we build upon this research call and from prior research to examine select
whistle blower characteristics and develop a model that may encapsulate the process.
As noted, the process of whistle blowing involves select elements (Near and Miceli 1985),
which are similar to the elements necessary for the process of occupational fraud: the fraudster,
the act, the organization, and the auditor. These essentials represent opposite sides of the same
coin and may guide research focus. For example, Cressey (1950, 1953) notes that there are three
crucial elements necessary for a fraudulent activity to take place – rationalization, pressure, and
opportunity. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) additionally introduce the concept of capability as a
crucial element, and Dorminey et al. (2012) identify a comprehensive model of the fraudster and
the fraudulent act that incorporates additional factors from prior research.
[Insert Figure 3.1 Here]
While this model has a focus on the fraud-committing side of the coin, we suggest that
many of the same elements are necessary for the fraud-reporting side, too. For example, instead of
pressure, potential whistle blowers may have a set of external factors that affect the individual
from the organization and environment to report wrongdoing. External factors such as the tone of
the code of conduct or the perceived ethics of co-workers may influence the would-be whistle
blower. Rationalization to report may be considered as an internal factor that influences the
whistle blower, and may include characteristics such as altruism, self-perceived ethics, or
narcissism; and the opportunity or capability to report may be dictated by available reporting
hotlines and the capability of the individual to identify and assess potential wrongdoing within the
organization.
We therefore believe that these factors and others have the potential to influence the timing
of a whistle blowing action within an organization, and we accordingly posit the following model:
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[Insert Figure 3.2 Here]
Under External Factors we examine whether the nature of the Code of Conduct, punitive
or positive, has an impact on whistle blowing. Additionally, we examine if the perceived ethics of
co-workers and of the company have a bearing on whistle blowing actions. Under Internal Factors
we examine whether perceived self-ethics, altruism, and narcissism have an effect on whistle
blowing. Under Opportunity / Capability, we provide the avenue for whistleblowing in the
experiment, ceding the development or identification of an opportunity, but we also measure the
risk literacy and cognitive ability level of the subjects, providing a measure of capability.
2.2 External Factors
Message Framing
Communications can be framed in terms of benefits or costs as a way to motivate behavior.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986) note that outcomes framed as positive (gain) often result in
risk aversive decisions, and that outcomes framed as negative (loss) often result in risk seeking
decisions, with the responses to losses being more extreme. Additionally, Tversky and Kahneman
note a loss aversion where an impact of a potential loss weighs greater than the impact of a gain.
Research in this area is somewhat mixed. In marketing in an examination of perceived risk
as it relates to price, Grewal et al. (1994) find that a positively framed message results in subjects
acting in a risk averse manner to secure gains than when the message is framed negatively. Also,
in marketing, Block and Keller (1995) note that when subjects process in-depth, a negative frame
is more persuasive than a positive frame in a health-related message.
Levin et al. (1998) note, though, that there are different types of valence framing. First,
there is the standard risky-choice framing as introduced by Tversky and Kahneman; second, there
is attribute framing which relates to the evaluation of characteristics of an object or event; and
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third, there is goal framing of messaging, which relates to the persuasiveness of a communication.
The two types of frames that may matter in regard to whistle blowing are risky-choice framing and
goal framing.
In the standard risky-choice scenario, the frame is a set of options with differing risk levels,
the risk preference is affected, and the effect is measured through a comparison of choices. In the
goal frame, the consequence is the frame, the impact of persuasion is affected, and the effect is
measured through a rate of adoption of the behavior. The difference in outcomes between the two
marketing studies may be due to the framing mechanism involved and to which element the subject
attend. For example, in the Grewal et al. (1994) study, the belief is that the subject attend to the
payoff, while the Block and Keller (1995) study attend to the consequence of the message.
This notion is supported by research. In regard to message framing, Cesario et al. (2013)
lay out a framework for predicting which message, positive or negative, will be more persuasive,
and the predictors lie at the individual level. Individual more attuned to the message and adopting
the behavior are persuaded more by a positive message, while individuals more attuned to the
outcome are persuaded more by a negative message.
A common corporate communication is the “corporate code of conduct,” which, too, may
be framed accordingly. For example, the code of conduct (CoC) may indicate the company’s desire
to have honest employees with great integrity (positive), or conversely, the CoC may indicate that
dishonesty or lack of integrity will result in the termination of employment (punitive or negative).
With limited cognitive processing, a positive CoC should trigger risk aversion and a negative CoC
should trigger risk seeking behavior. With extensive cognitive processing, though, the opposite
could be true. It would depend upon the aspect of the subject’s focus, the outcome, or the message.
Therefore, following the logic of negative messaging leads to risk seeking behavior, and positive
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messaging leads to risk aversive behavior, we can hypothesize those exposed to a negative
(positive) code of conduct will report later (earlier).The contrast is, though, that simple loss
aversion would suggest that a CoC with a negative or punitive message will have a greater impact
on employees, and therefore would encourage potential whistle blowers to act more promptly, else
viewed as someone without integrity. If the negative message is more persuasive, then it would
lead us to believe the subjects attended more to the outcome and less readily to the message. Since
the literature is mixed, this leads us to state our first hypothesis in the null:
H1:

Subjects exposed to a negative or positive code of conduct will not differ in
reporting behavior (earlier or later).

Ethics of Others
Most individuals do not work independently but rather work for an organization and within
a functional group, and that group develops a general uniformity and normalization of behavior
(Greenberg et al. 1997; Baumeister and Leary 1995; Festinger 1950). The normalization of this
behavior also impacts decision making by the individual based upon the perception of the group
norm (Fleming and Barkhi 2007; Fleming 2008), as the individual attempts to conform. Therefore,
in an organizational fraud scenario, an important external factor that may influence an employee
as to whether and when to become a tipster would be the perceived ethics of the company in general
and the perceived ethics of their co-workers. If they perceive their group to be ethical, then in the
process of conformity they will wish to mimic the group. Since group membership is ultimately a
self-selection process, conformity and adoption of norms and beliefs reduces potential cognitive
dissonance – I want to belong to the group, the group has this belief, and therefore I have this
belief. This leads us to our second and third hypotheses:
H2:

Subjects who perceive a higher (lower) level of ethics of their co-workers will
whistle blow earlier (later).
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2.3 Internal Factors:
Self-Ethics
Building from above, it can be reasoned that if individuals naturally perceive self-ethics to
be high, or if they adopt high self-ethics from the group, they will adopt the ethical path to whistle
blow early. This leads us to the hypothesis:
H3:

Subjects who perceive a higher (lower) level of self-ethics will whistle blow earlier
(later).

Altruism
Altruism can be defined as individual behavior that benefits another individual or
organization, without an expectation of reward or benefit. Schwartz (1977) presents the idea that
altruistic behavior is causal in nature, stemming from a moral obligation to act based on the
individual’s personally held beliefs. Leeds (1963) stipulates altruistic behavior to include an act
without self-gain, that is voluntary in nature, and that results in good. Researchers also note that
whistle blowing is an altruistic, prosocial behavior (e.g., Dozier and Miceli 1985; Bhal and
Dadhich 2011). We can reason, then, that an individual with higher altruism will engage more
quickly with the prosocial behavior of whistle blowing, affected less by the expectation of reward
or benefit, and that individuals with lower altruism may be influenced more by a reward potential
and/or may report later.
H4:

Subjects with a higher (lower) altruism score will whistle blow earlier (later).

Narcissism
Narcissism relates to an inflated sense of self-importance, a need for admiration, and even
a certain lack of empathy for others (American Psychiatric Association 2000). At the normal or
sub-clinical level, seven sub-constructs of narcissism are measured in the Narcissistic Personality
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Inventory

(NPI)

and

include

authority,

self-sufficiency,

superiority,

exhibitionism,

exploitativeness, vanity, and entitlement (Raskin and Terry 1988). In this study we used the 9-item
narcissism scale developed by Jones and Paulhus (2013) which taps into four subconstructs of
narcissism: Leadership, exhibitionism, grandiosity, entitlement. Individuals higher on the
continuum of narcissism are prone to seeking behaviors that perpetuate perceived self-importance,
power, and authority, for which whistle blowing may fulfill the need. At the moment of whistle
blowing, the tipster is the individual with the vital information that the organization wants and
desires. By being the whistle blower, the individual may have a sense of superiority and expect
admiration from those at the pinnacle of the organization. Given these traits, we develop the
following hypothesis:
H5:

Subjects with a higher (lower) narcissism score will whistle blow earlier (later).

2.4 Opportunity Factor: Capability and Numeracy
Numeracy is often described as the ability to understand and use numerical information in
relation to risk and cognition and is widely studied in medicine (e.g., Reyna et al. 2009; Peters et
al. 2007; Lusardi 2012). In this research we view numeracy as a component of capability, noting
that it may be moderately related, but definitely linked to general intelligence (Lag et al. 2013). In
this study we utilize statistical numeracy as a measure of risk, noted by Cockely et al. (2012) to
encompass decision-making under risk involving statistical probabilities and probabilistic
reasoning.
When to whistle blow may involve a certain amount of risk analysis. The individual must
be of sufficient intellect to recognize a fraud, the individual must perform a cost/benefit analysis
weighing the various risks of whistle blowing versus doing nothing, and lastly the individual may
consider the potential financial reward of being the whistle blower. In our scenario, we provide
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the growth of the known fraud, the likelihood of the fraud being discovered by the company from
one period to the next, and the potential financial benefit to the whistle blower based on a
percentage of the total fraudulent amount. To process this information, a certain amount of
numeracy is beneficial. Given these aspects, we hypothesize the following:
H6:

Subjects with a higher (lower) numeracy score will whistle blow earlier (later).

3.0 Research Methodology
3.1 Research Case
Subjects were solicited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk). IRB protocols were
followed in all regards4. Approximately one week prior to the experiment subjects completed a
short on-line survey that measured altruism with fourteen items, statistical numeracy with the six
questions from the Berlin Numeracy Test, and narcissism with nine items. The survey also
collected demographic information such as age, gender, work experience, and education level.
To test the research hypotheses a computer-based case was developed whereby participants
read a short vignette describing their role as an employee and their knowledge as to an affirmed
fraud. In the scenario the current extent of the fraud was described using a fictional currency and
the monetary growth of the unchecked fraud of 40% by period. The scenario also indicated that
there was a 1 in 5 chance (20%) that the company would discover the fraud on their own during
any period. Subjects were also told that if they acted as a whistle blower and the fraud was yet
undiscovered, they would receive 20% of the gross fraudulent amount. Subjects were paid a flat
$1 for participating in the experiment plus a portion of the reported fraud total. A conversion
formula was provided for the subjects to calculate the potential payout. See Appendix 3.1 for the
vignette.

4

IRB Protocol #1911788447
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3.2 Design and Variables
The experiment is a 2 x 1 between-subjects, random assignment design. The corporate code
of conduct manipulation (punitive rules or positive principles) was also randomly assigned. Each
subject read a code of conduct at the start of the experiment in conjunction with the vignette. The
punitive rule-based code of conduct uses phrases such as “If you act without integrity, you will be
terminated,” while the principle-based code of conduct uses phases such as “We encourage you to
act with integrity.” As a manipulation check and as our independent variable, we have subjects
score the relative tone of the code of conduct at the end of the experiment. See Appendix 3.2a for
the punitive code of conduct and Appendix 3.2b for the positive code of conduct.
In addition to the above treatments, we measure altruism, narcissism, and risk and
numerical intelligence using a six-item Berlin Numeracy test (Cokely et al. 2012).
3.3 Participants
A total of 298 subjects participated in part 1 (pre-experiment survey) of the study. There
were 166 female and 132 male subjects with a mean age of 40.42 years and an average of 18.77
years of work experience. Of the initial 298, 232 returned for part 2 (the experiment simulation)
of the study, for a 77.9% completion rate. Given the study is looking at whistleblower behavior,
we chose to target a sample of participants that have diverse backgrounds since nearly anyone can
be a whistleblower. We therefore elected to use M-Turk for our sample selection and experimental
delivery.
For our analysis we use the subjects who did report, and our dependent variable of interest
is the Reporting Period. That is to say, we are interested in characteristics that may influence an
individual as to when they elect to become a tipster.
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4.0 Results
The results provide interesting insights into when and why someone will act as a whistle
blower. First, it is worth noting that out of 232 participants, 194 subjects elected to blow the whistle
at some point during the experiment. The thirty-eight subjects who did not blow the whistle were
eliminated in various six rounds by the 1-in-5 chance of the fraud discovery by the company. Since
we do not know the specific intentions of the thirty-eight eliminated subjects, they are excluded
from the analysis. Table 3.1 indicates the number of subjects reporting by round.
[Insert Table 3.1 Here]
4.1 Main Effect Results
Based on univariate analysis, main effect results for our stated hypotheses are mixed.
Beginning with the External Factors and hypotheses we note:
H1, the null hypothesis that subjects exposed to a negative (positive) code of conduct will
not differ in reporting behavior, could not be rejected, therefore there was no support for framing
affecting reporting behavior. H2, subjects who perceive a higher (lower) level of ethics of their coworkers will whistle blow earlier (later), is supported. The coefficient was negative with a p-value
of 0.031 (two-tail), which indicates that participants that perceived a higher level of ethics of their
co-workers blew the whistle significantly earlier compared to those who had a lower perception.
For External Factors within the model, only the perception of ethics of fellow employees
is significant, and subjects who rated their fellow employees as ethical tend to whistle blow earlier.
Main effect results for Internal Factors are also mixed. We find the following:
H3, subjects who perceive a higher (lower) level of self-ethics will whistle blow earlier (later), is
not supported. H4, subjects with a higher (lower) altruism score will whistle blow earlier (later),
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is not supported, but the beta coefficient was negative as hypothesized. H5, subjects with a higher
(lower) narcissism score will whistle blow earlier (later), is not supported.
For Internal Factors within the model, none are significant.
Main effects for the Opportunity / Capability Factor as measured by numeracy, H6,
subjects with a higher (lower) numeracy score will whistle blow earlier (later), is not supported.
[Insert Table 3.2 Here]
4.2 Interaction Effects Results
Interaction effects between narcissism and the perceived ethics of other employees is
significant with a two-tail p-value of 0.022 and has a positive beta coefficient. This would indicate
that if a subject perceives other employees to be ethical, then whistle blowing action will occur
later. If, though, the perception is that other employees score lower on ethics, the subject will report
earlier.
The interaction effect is interesting. First, the research suggests that self-perceived ethics,
perceived ethics of other employees, and personal narcissism levels matter. From a risk perspective,
the narcissistic employee will report later, if the perception is that other employees are ethical.
In addition, in a model with only altruism and tone of the code of conduct, the interaction
is moderately significant with a two-tail p-value of 0.054 and a negative coefficient. This indicates
that individuals that score higher in altruism and are in a firm with a positive code of conduct blow
the whistle early.
[Insert Table 3.3 Here]
4.3 Additional Analysis
Additional analysis reveals that males and individuals with higher levels of education
significantly delayed whistleblowing compared to females and less educated individuals. This
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could be an indication that more educated individuals were not only able to realize the financial
benefit of delaying the decision to blow the whistle but also make an educated decision based on
the probability of the fraud being detected by another employee and thus losing potential benefits.
In addition, with regards to gender, the results are consistent with prior literature showing that
males are more risk taking than females. The implications of these specific findings may apply to
workplaces that are predominantly male. Furthermore, while higher education is weighted
favorably for upper-level positions, it may have some unintended consequences on the employers’
end.
[Insert Table 3.4 Here]
Interestingly, participants who believes that violations to code of conduct will result in
employee termination blew the whistle significantly earlier, and those who were presented in the
negative code of conduct believed their employment was significantly more likely to be terminated.
In other words, firms that utilize a punitive code of conduct may cause employees to believe they
are more likely to be terminated for any violations and hence employees will behave more ethically.
Mediation analyses reveal that tone of code of conduct had a moderate indirect effect with a onetail p-value of 0.0515.
[Insert Figure 3.3 Here]
[Insert Table 3.5 Here]
Further analysis was performed on a dichotomous dependent variable for whether
participants reported on the first period or not. This analysis sheds light on the characteristics of
the most ethical who did not delay whistleblowing at all. Utilizing a logistic regression to
investigate main effects we witness that gender had a significant effect on the likelihood of
reporting on the first period. Specifically, males were significantly less likely to blow the whistle
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in the first period compared to females with a two-tail p-value of 0.015. However, contrary to the
initial univariate analysis, the perception of how ethical the surrounding employees are did not
have a significant main effect (p-value 0.14, two-tail). In other words, how ethical a subject
perceived his/her fellow co-worker did not affect the subject’s decision to blow the whistle in the
first period, but surprisingly the perception of self-ethics was significant in that those participants
who perceived themselves as ethical were significantly more likely to blow the whistle in the first
period with a two-tail p-value of 0.026. In addition, when examining the interaction effects, we
find that two interactions were significant. First, the interaction between narcissism and perception
of self-ethics was moderately significant and positive (p-value 0.078, two-tail), indicating that
those who are more narcissistic and perceive themselves as ethical were more likely to blow the
whistle in period one, compared to those who were lower on narcissism and self-ethics. Second,
the interaction between narcissism and perception of how ethical the other employees are was
significant but negative (p-value 0.019, two-tail), which means that those who were more
narcissistic and perceived other employees to be ethical were less likely to blow the whistle in
period one compared to those who were lower on narcissism and perceived other employees to be
less ethical.
[Insert Table 3.6 Here]
5.0 Summary and conclusions
The high cost of occupational fraud, combined with the fact that most frauds are not
discovered through analysis but rather through whistle blower action, highlight the need for
continued research in this area, particularly for management and corporate financial executives,
audit committees, internal auditors, and external auditors.
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This research adds to the literature in two primary aspects. First, a new theoretical structure
and model is introduced that describes the behavioral components in whistle blowing, and second,
the model is experimentally tested to identify which components may influence whistle blowing
outcomes. We find that individual characteristics such as narcissism, self-perceived ethics, and
perceived ethics of other employees positively influence whistle blowing activity. We also find
that the framing of the content of the code of conduct as either positive or punitive matters. A
punitive code of conduct creates the perception that employment is more likely to be terminated,
which causes individuals to whistle blow earlier.
There are several limits and weaknesses of this research. The experimental approach lends
itself to higher internal validity while sacrificing external validity, and this research falls into that
category. The research utilizes a game to test the hypotheses, which may in fact not represent an
ecological possibility. Rarely will an employee know and understand the likelihood of discovery
of the fraud by the company with certainty, nor will they know and understand the fraud growth.
This design choice was determined to be an experimental necessity, though, and one we undertook
knowing the limitations and criticisms it may generate.
The research does highlight many areas for future research. Additional personal
characteristics may be studied within the framework of the model, and additional nuances of
corporate control may be explored as factors to influence whistle blowing. Potential training may
be explored as a counter to the negative traits, and their effectiveness may be monitored and
measured, too. The research in this area has the potential for both academic and professional
impact and may help inform those beyond the accounting arena.
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Appendix:
Figure 3.1 – Dorminey et al. (2012) Model

58

Figure 3.2 – The Whistleblower Triangle
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Figure 3.2 – Mediation Analysis

Mediation Diagram:

Period
Reported

Tone of CoC

Path A
-0.77***

Path B
-0.099*
Likelihood of
Termination

Path AB (indirect effect):
0.076* (one-tailed)
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TABLE 3.1 Subjects Reporting by Round
Round

Subjects Reporting

Male

Female

% Reporting

Cumulative %

1

144

57

87

62.1

74.2

2

18

7

11

9.3

83.5

3

17

11

6

8.8

92.3

4

10

7

3

5.2

97.5

5

4

2

2

2.1

99.6

6

1

1

0

0.5

100

194

85

109

Total
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TABLE 3.2 Univariate Analysis
DV – period
reported
CoC

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.0735
(0.150)
-0.131**
(0.0604)

Ethical_Emp.

Ethical_Me

-0.0539
(0.0752)

Altruism

-0.0930
(0.117)

Narcissism

0.0429
(0.117)

Berlin_Num.

_cons
N
R2

(6)

0.0773
(0.0586)
1.495***
(0.105)
194
0.001

1.542***
(0.0744)
194
0.024

1.542***
(0.0765)
194
0.003

1.535***
(0.0752)
194
0.003

1.529***
(0.0752)
194
0.001

1.420***
(0.113)
194
0.009

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.2 represents six univariate OLS regression models with the dependent variable (period reported) in the top
row and the independent variables in the first column.
Dependent variable: period reported represents the period in which the participant blew the whistle, higher scores
represent participants’ decision to delay whistleblowing behavior.
Independent variables: CoC is a dichotomous variable representing the tone of code of conduct presented to the
participants (0 = negative tone, 1 = positive tone). Ethical_Emp. Represents how ethical the participant perceived
the employees that worked with him were, higher scores represent a perception of more ethical co-workers.
Ethical_Me represents the how ethical the participant perceived him/herself. Altruism represents how altruistic a
participant is, higher score means more altruistic/pro-social. Narcissism represents the degree of the trait of
narcissism within the participant with higher scores reflecting more narcissistic individuals. Berlin_num is the
participants score on the berlin numeracy test, which assesses statistical numeracy and risk literacy.
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TABLE 3.3 Interaction Effects Analysis

Narcissism

(1)
Period reported
-0.0236
(0.118)

Ethical_Emp.

-0.141**
(0.0600)

Narc*Ethemp

0.202**
(0.0873)

(2)
Period reported

Altruism

0.128
(0.164)

CoC

0.0987
(0.150)

CoC*Altr.

-0.451*
(0.232)

_cons
N
R2

1.544***
(0.0739)
194
0.051

1.495***
(0.104)
194
0.024

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.3 represents 2 OLS regression models with the dependent variable (period reported) in the top row and the
independent variables in the first column.
Dependent variable: period reported represents the period in which the participant blew the whistle, higher scores
represent participants’ decision to delay whistleblowing behavior.
Independent variables: Narcissism represents the degree of the trait of narcissism within the participant with higher
scores reflecting more narcissistic individuals. Ethical_Emp. Represents how ethical the participant perceived the
employees that worked with him were, higher scores represent a perception of more ethical co-workers. Altruism
represents how altruistic a participant is, higher score means more altruistic/pro-social. CoC is a dichotomous
variable representing the tone of code of conduct presented to the participants (0 = negative tone, 1 = positive tone).
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TABLE 3.4 Additional Analysis – Main Effects

(1)
Period reported
Gender

0.390***
(0.148)

Education

0.196**
(0.0990)

_cons

0.983***
(0.218)
194
0.051

N
R2

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4 represents 1 OLS regression models with the dependent variable (period reported) in the top row and the
independent variables in the first column.
Dependent variable: period reported represents the period in which the participant blew the whistle, higher scores
represent participants’ decision to delay whistleblowing behavior.
Independent variables: gender is a dichotomous variable representing gender (0 = female, 1 = male). Education is an
ordinal variable representing how educated the participant is with higher scores reflecting a higher degree of
education.
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TABLE 3.5 Additional Analysis – Mediation
(1)
Model
DV: Emp_Terminate
CoC

-0.773***
(0.182)

_cons

6.384***
(0.127)

DV: period reported
Emp_Terminate

-0.0989*
(0.0561)

_cons

2.125***
(0.345)
194

N
R2

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.5 represents the mediation analysis via SEM. In the first part of the model, we have the dependent variable
“Emp_Terminate” which is the participants’ perception of how likely he/she will be terminated if they violate the
codes of conduct with higher score representing higher likelihood of termination. The independent variable in the
first part is CoC which is a dichotomous variable representing the tone of code of conduct presented to the
participants (0 = negative tone, 1 = positive tone). In the second part the dependent variable is period_reported
which represents the period in which the participant blew the whistle, higher scores represent participants’ decision
to delay whistleblowing behavior.
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TABLE 3.6 Additional Analysis – Reported in Period 1 versus Did Not Report

(1)
Period 1

(2)
Period 1

Gender

-0.702**
(0.287)

-0.825***
(0.297)

Narcissism

0.0327
(0.230)

0.0626
(0.240)

Ethical_Me

0.305**
(0.137)

0.295**
(0.139)

Ethical_Emp.

0.177
(0.120)

0.201
(0.125)

Period To Discover

-0.0610*
(0.0355)

-0.0637*
(0.0351)

Narc*Ethical_me

0.383*
(0.217)

Narc*Ethical_emp

-0.458**
(0.196)

_cons
N

0.818***
(0.199)
232

0.869***
(0.207)
232

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.6 presents two logistic regression models.
Dependent variable: Period 1 represent whether participants blew the whistle in the first period or not (0 = did not
report, 1 = did report).
Independent variables: gender is a dichotomous variable representing gender (0 = female, 1 = male). Ethical_Me
represents the how ethical the participant perceived him/herself. Ethical_Emp. Represents how ethical the
participant perceived the employees that worked with him were, higher scores represent a perception of more ethical
co-workers. Narcissism represents the degree of the trait of narcissism within the participant with higher scores
reflecting more narcissistic individuals. Periods To Discover is a continuous variable representing how many periods
participants judged the fraud would be discovered in the company if they did not blow the whistle, higher scores
mean participants expect the fraud to continue for longer times undiscovered.
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Appendix 3.7 – Experiment Vignette

During the course of your work at Erimo Inc., you recently discovered a significant financial
“discrepancy” in the recording of sales and the subsequent collection of receivables. You are
confident that this discrepancy is the result of fraud or unethical behavior.
You have also recently learned that when there is a financial discrepancy of this type, the
individual who first reports the discrepancy is entitled to a 20% reward of the discrepant
amount.
You estimate that the current financial discrepancy is 100 Lira, and that the discrepancy is
growing at a rate of 40% each period.
You also estimate that each period you do not report the discrepancy, there is a 20% chance that
Erimo Inc. will discover the discrepancy by some other means, in which case you will not be
entitled to any reward.
Your task is to decide whether or not to report the discrepancy each period.
If you report the 100 Lira discrepancy during Period 1, your reward will be 20 Lira (100 Lira
discrepancy x 20% reward). If you do not report the discrepancy this period, there is a 20%
likelihood that Erimo will discover the discrepancy by some other means, in which case you will
not be entitled to a reward. If the discrepancy is not discovered by some other means, it will
grow to 140 Lira in Period 2 (100 * 1.4 to account for 40% growth). You will then have the
opportunity to report the discrepancy and earn a reward of 28 Lira (140 Lira x 20% reward), or
delay reporting further.
The game will progress period by period until either (1) you report the discrepancy and earn a
reward of 20% of the accumulated discrepancy amount, or (2) Erimo Inc. discovers the
discrepancy, and you earn no reward.
At the conclusion of this study, you will receive additional compensation based upon the Lira
awarded in the game. The conversion is 100 Lira to $1. For example, 20 Lira are worth $0.20.

You have read the Erimo Corporate Code of Conduct, and you are aware of the discrepancy. You
will now proceed to Period 1 of the task.
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Appendix 3.8a: Punitive Code of Conduct

Erimo Inc.
Corporate Code of Conduct
Last revised and approved by the Erimo Inc. Board of Directors 1/1/2019
Erimo Inc. has a strict code of compliance in which employees must know their responsibilities
and raise ethical concerns. We insist on ethical conduct and compliance with the law; and are
resolute that business results are never more important than ethical conduct and compliance
with Erimo Inc. policies.
Erimo's Leaders must also take the following steps to build an infrastructure to prevent, detect,
and correct compliance issues: Identify business compliance risks, provide education on Erimo
policies and applicable law, implement control measures, promote an effective ombudsperson
internal reporting system, conduct periodic compliance reviews, promptly correct compliance
weaknesses, and take appropriate disciplinary action.
➢ If you act without integrity you will be terminated.
➢ You will be retained only if you are honest, fair, and trustworthy.
➢ Failure to obey applicable laws, regulations, and financial rules will result in
termination.
➢ You must promptly report any concerns you have regarding violations of this Code.
Failure to do so will result in dismissal.

68

Appendix 3.8b: Positvie Code of Conduct

Erimo Inc.
Corporate Code of Conduct
Last revised and approved by the Erimo Inc. Board of Directors 1/1/2019
Erimo Inc. has a culture of compliance in which employees understand their responsibilities and
feel comfortable raising ethical concerns. We encourage ethical conduct and compliance with the
law; and ensure that business results are never more important than ethical conduct and
compliance with Erimo Inc. policies.

Erimo's Leaders must also take the following steps to build an infrastructure to prevent, detect,
and correct compliance issues: Identify business compliance risks, provide education on Erimo
policies and applicable law, implement control measures, promote an effective ombudsperson
internal reporting system, conduct periodic compliance reviews, promptly correct compliance
weaknesses, and take appropriate disciplinary action.
➢ We encourage you to act with integrity.
➢ We want you to be honest, fair, and trustworthy.
➢ We want employees to obey applicable laws, regulations, and financial rules.
➢ We encourage you to promptly report any concerns you have regarding violations of this
Code.
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ABSTRACT
Prior studies in the fraud literature have focused on different components of the fraud
triangle. However, little research has a been done to better understand those who are tasked with
examining a potential fraud. For that reason, we investigate multiple factors that may impact the
task selection process for the examination of occupational fraud. Specifically, we look at personal
characteristics of the fraud examiner, such as skepticism, narcissism, tolerance for ambiguity, and
trust, and how they interact with outside factors, such as the level of detail in a tip, the framing of
a possible promotion, or type of supervisor, when the examiner has different types of fraud cases
to examine (e.g., internal versus external, single versus collusion).

Key words: narcissism, framing, skepticism, emotional intelligence, fraud examination
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Occupational fraud continues to be a significant cost to organizations and the capital
markets. The purpose of this research is to examine preferences to tasks by fraud examiners within
the organization. While research has been performed on individuals perpetrating deviant behavior,
firm reactions to fraud, market reactions to fraud, and external audit firm reactions to fraud, little
research has been conducted relative to the individuals within the organization examining fraud.
Building from a perspective similar to that of the Fraud Triangle (e.g., Cressey, 1950, 1953;
Albrecht and Albrect, 2004), where the incursion of fraud was necessitated by three factors
consisting of opportunity, rationalization, and financial pressure; we utilize a mirrored look from
the angle of the fraud investigator. First, what situational factors stemming from the evidence may
drive efforts to assess and investigate? Second, what internal factors that may be relevant to the
investigative individual may drive an investigative decision? Third, what external factors may
drive an investigative decision?
Across three studies we test for evidence of task preference. In experiment one, we examine
the impact of the level of detail of the anonymous tip on perceived seriousness and budgetary
considerations through the lens of Credibility Theory. In experiment two, we examine the framing
of the choice of fraud examination upon which an examiner may work, along with the origination
of the potential fraud. In experiment three, we examine the potential impact of supervisor
emotional intelligence and the type of examination.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Participants were from the Middle East region. The participants were participating in a
forensic accounting and fraud examination 3-day workshop. The experiment(s) were conducted
prior to training. All participants were fluent in English, and the instruments were in English.
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Participants self-selected into the training and voluntarily participated in the experiment. IRB
approval was obtained for the experiment(s) and is available upon request.
The experimental group comprised forty-one female and thirty-one male subjects, with an
average age of 33.41 years and 10.39 years of work experience. Seventeen participants (23.9%)
indicated they were internal auditors or the equivalent. Table 1 contains the breakdown of
demographic information.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section (2) provides the general literature
review regarding whistleblowing. Section (3) provides study one with its respective literature
review, hypothesis, and results. Section (4) presents study two (following the same format as
section 3), and section (5) presents study three and then, lastly, section (5) concludes.
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Whistleblowing
Whistleblowing makes up an important part of the fraud research. Studies have mostly
investigated whistleblower characteristics and incentives that cause individuals to blow the whistle.
In addition, research has also looked at characters specific to the firm where the whistleblowing
act occurs (Kerler et al., 2021). Specifically, Bjørkelo et al. (2010) looks at the personality of the
whistleblower, Dalton & Radtke (2013) look at whistleblower’s morality and level of
Machiavellianism, Reckers-Sauciuc and Lowe (2010) examined the tipsters’ mood. On the other,
researchers investigating incentives have looked at compensation and financial rewards (Brink et
al., 2013; Berger et al., 2017, Scheetz and Wall, 2019). From the firm’s perspective studies have
investigated how codes of conducts (Davidson and Stevens, 2013), organizational justice (Seifert
et al., 2010) and leadership within the firm (Liu et al., 2015) play a role in employees’ decision to
report a potential fraud or not. However, a research gap exists regarding the investigation of fraud.
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Therefore, this study looks at how internal auditors’ judgment and decision making in terms of
how serious they would rate a potential fraud and how much resources they would allocate.
3.0 STUDY ONE
3.1 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development
Source credibility theory centers around the level of confidence an individual places on a
message, based upon the perceived credibility of the source (Hovland and Weiss, 1951; Hovland
et al., 1953). Accounting research has supported the effect of the theory on audit committees
(DeZoort et al., 2003) and tax professionals (Alexander, 2003), but as noted by Maksymov (2015),
the literature of the effect on auditor’s judgment is limited and represents a research gap.
An internal auditor obtains whistleblower tips from various sources both within and
without an organization, and source credibility may be a factor impacting judgment, with more
creditable sources positively impacting the seriousness of the tip and the resources allocated to a
potential examination. Stated in the alternative form, we hypothesize
H1a: The greater (lower) the source credibility, the greater (lesser) the seriousness placed
on a whistle blower tip.
H1b: The greater (lower) the source credibility, the greater (lesser) the resources allocated
to examine the whistle blower tip.
Work experience has shown to have positive on auditor’s professional judgment (Hussin
et al., 2017), and also impact analytical reviews (Cohen et al., 1989). Work experience may allow
the professional to discern nuances from whistle blower tips that may yet to be leveraged by a less
experienced auditor. Therefore, we hypothesize that
H2a: The greater (lower) the work experience, the greater (lesser) the seriousness placed
on a whistle blower tip.

74

H2b: The greater (lower) the work experience, the greater (lesser) the resources allocated
to examine the whistle blower tip.
3.2 Methodology
We discuss below the design, participants, experimental procedures and task, independent
variables, and dependent variables for experiment one.
Design
The experiment utilizes a 2 x 1 between-subject design, manipulating the level of tip
detail.
Participants
The experimental group comprised forty-one female and thirty-one male subjects, with an
average age of 33.61 years and 10.34 years of work experience. Eighteen participants (25.55%)
indicated they were internal auditors or the equivalent. Table 1 contains the breakdown of
demographic information.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Sixty-four (64) participants completed study one. Table 2 contains the breakdown of
demographic information for study one.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Experimental Procedure and Task
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and various psychometric base-line
instruments for the experiment(s). For experiment one, subjects read that they worked for a
company and are involved with anti-fraud efforts of operation. They were assigned to read one of
the following whistle blower transcribed tips:
Less detail:
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I’m an employee in Procurement, and I think the company paid several duplicate invoices
last month to a consultant for services that were never properly approved or actually performed.
If I were to estimate, I would say it was close to $100,000 in total last month.
More detail:
I’m a purchasing agent in the Home Office Procurement Department, and the company
paid 8 invoices within the last 29 days, 4 of which were duplicate invoices, to a consultant for
services that were never properly approved by Procurement or were actually performed. The total
amount of the invoices in question were $99,853 last month.
The participants were asked to rate the seriousness of the tip on a 7-point Likert scale;
allocate a percentage of their budget to the examination of the tip (0% to 100%); rate the credibility
of the tip on a 7-point Likert scale; and rate the level of detail of the tip on a 7-point Likert scale.
Independent Variables
Credibility is operationalized by script detail (fixed factor: less, more). The belief is that
greater detail is associated with greater credibility. The manipulation of credibility by script detail
was measured by the 7-point Likert scale (1=not at all credible to 7=extremely credible),
controlling for total experience. The manipulation appears to be successful (p-value=0.032).
Control Variables
Consistent with prior research, the demographic measure of total experience was included
as a control variable. We also asked participants if they were an internal auditor or equivalent, and
to rate their experience level as it relates to investigating whistle blower tips (1=not experience to
7=very experienced).
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are seriousness of the whistle blower tip (Likert scale, 1= not at
all serious to 7=extremely serious) and allocation of budget (0% to 100% in 10% increments).
3.3 Results
To test our hypotheses, we performed two OLS regressions with seriousness and budget
resources allocated as the dependent variable and script detail, total experience, internal auditor
designation, and investigation experience as independent variables (see table 3 for study one
analysis).
Our first pair of hypotheses is that the greater the source credibility, via the script detail
manipulation, the greater the seriousness (H1a) and budget resources allocated (H1b) toward the
examination. For the rating of seriousness results show that the manipulation had a positive effect
(coefficient=.286), which means the group that were presented with more detailed script rated the
tip as more serious, but the effect was not significant (p-value=0.346, two tailed). Hence, H1a was
not supported. However, if the participant was an internal auditor, they rated the seriousness
significantly lower than non-internal auditors (coefficient=-0.691, p-value=0.046, two tailed). For
the second dependent variable (resources allocated) results show that script detail manipulation
did not have a significant effect (coefficient=-0.019, p-value=0.704, two-tailed), which means H1b
is also not supported. However, having an internal auditor position was also not significant and
instead experience with whistleblowing investigations had a moderate positive effect on resource
allocation (coefficient=0.03, p-value=0.079, two tailed), which shows that individuals with more
whistleblowing experience allocated more resources to investigate the tip than those with less
experience.
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Our second pair of hypotheses is that the greater the work experience, then the greater the
seriousness (H2a) and budget resources allocated (H2b) toward the examination. Results for
seriousness show that as total work experience increased the rating of seriousness also increased
(coefficient=0.037, p-value=0.07, two-tailed), indicating that H2a is moderately supported. On the
other hand, when we examine resources allocated as the dependent variable, results show a
significant main effect for total experience, but the effect was negative (coefficient=-0.01, pvalue=0.005, two-tailed). This is in the opposite direction of H2b, therefore H2b is not supported.
Interestingly, though, in revisiting H1a and H1b, if we substitute script detail with either
the participants’ own rating of level of detail or credibility measure, we find results supportive of
expectations regarding source credibility theory. In this analysis, perceived tip detail level and
credibility were significant and in the expected direction for both dependent variables, seriousness
rating (perceived tip detail level coefficient=0.488, p-value=0.002, two-tailed and credibility
coefficient=0.506, p-value=0.000, two-tailed) and resources allocated (perceived tip detail level
coefficient=0.083, p-value=0.002, two-tailed and credibility coefficient=0.047, p-value=0.035,
two-tailed). The effect of total experience remained qualitatively the same. This suggests that
source credibility is significant as measured, although the script manipulation is not. Further, it
appears that total experience plays a significant role in rating tip seriousness and budget allocation
judgments. These findings, taken together, suggest partial support for our hypotheses for
experiment one.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
4.0 STUDY TWO
4.1 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) suggests that individual align themselves
to groups, adopting the group norms and beliefs, and to a certain degree, protecting themselves
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and the group from deviant behavior. The behavior of aligning the self with the group is partly
motivated by the need to belong to a group (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). This also applies within
organizational membership which Asforth and Mael (1989) found that social identity led to
increased in-group and organizational support. In addition, Terry et al. (1999) built upon social
identity theory by combining it with the theory of planned behavior. Specifically, the authors look
at how identifying with a group can cause a difference in judgement and behavior of group
members. In accounting literature, Bazerman et al. (1997) argue that it is psychologically
impossible for external auditors to maintain independence, which hinders the objectivity of
judgments and decisions made. In addition, studies have shown the auditors’ decisions are affected
by the extent to which the auditors socially identify themselves with their clients, which could be
mitigated by firm rotation rules (Bergner, 2011). Not only that, but studies have also shown that
social identity cause auditors to agree more with client’s decisions (Bamber and Iyer, 2007; Bauer,
2015). However, based on research in social affinity, Ames et al. (2015) finds that while there is
an in-group bias where individuals tend to favor group members, once an in-group member is
perceived to have behaved unethically or against group norms then that group member is actually
treated more harshly than out-group members.
From this theory it is reasonable to expect that auditors align themselves to their employer,
and therefore the most unappealing behavior would be that of a fraud committed by a fellow
employee. A fraud committed by an outsider is one who does not necessarily share the norms of
the company, while someone within the company violating norms may create the most dissonance
and incongruency in values and beliefs. A fraud examination is a method of potentially alleviating
this dissonance, and therefore we hypothesize
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H3: Ceteris paribus, an auditor will choose to examine a company employee over a nonemployee.
Research on framing as it relates to judgment and decision making is very extensive.
Attribute framing, describing something in either positive or negative terms, can play a role in
choice selection, with positive framed choices being more attractive. Rultedge and Harrell (1994)
find that framing information to management accountants in a positive or negative way can lead
to risk-taking or risk averse decisions in a group setting compared to individuals. Duchon et al.
(1989) researched the effect of framing on employees within the engineering industry and find that
framing also affected business decisions and perceptions of risk as they relate to R&D financial
allocations. In addition, Kerler et al. (2012) examined whether there is an interaction between
attribute framing and the importance of a potential project and find support for framing affecting
budgeting decisions with positive frame resulting in higher likelihood of project approval, and for
the moderating role played by importance of project as results show framing having an effect when
a project is less important but not when the project is very important. Furthermore, research has
also documented the effect framing has on decision in different fields, such as consumers,
gambling and medical (Levin et al., 1988, 1989 and 1996). Prospect Theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) encapsulates framing in that the risky choice is affected by the outcome frame
or “prospect.” When given an examination task, a positive frame outcome may be more attractive
over a negative frame outcome, but it may be impacted by other factors, such as the target of the
examination. In other words, we expect an interaction between the target under examination and
potential reward outcome. The reward outcome influences the choice of examined target, such that
subjects will select to examine employees when the reward outcome is framed as “the promotion
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is yours to win,” and subjects will select to examine non-employees when the reward outcome is
framed as “the promotion is yours to lose.”
H4: An auditor will choose to examine a company employee more (less) often over a nonemployee when the outcome contingency is framed as a promotion to win (lose).
4.2 Methodology
We discuss below the design, participants, experimental procedures and task, independent
variables, and dependent variables for experiment two.
Design
The experiment utilizes a 2 x 1 between-subject design, manipulating the frame of the
promotion potential outcome of the participant.
Participants
Forty-six (46) participants completed experiment 2. Table 3 contains the breakdown of
demographic information for the participants that completed in study two.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Experimental Procedure and Task
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and various psychometric base-line
instruments for the experiment(s). For experiment two, subjects read that they worked for a
company and are involved with anti-fraud efforts of operation. They were told they had the
opportunity to select their next examination assignment from a list of four projects. They were
additionally told before choosing the assignment either “Your promotion review is coming up, and
it is yours to win,” or “your promotion review is coming up, and it is yours to lose.”
Project selection list:
1. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a company employee.
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2. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a supplier to the company.
3. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a company employee and an outside
supplier working together.
4. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving at least two company employees.
Subjects then selected their assignment and were also given the opportunity to
parenthetically explain why it was selected. The participants were asked to rate the seriousness of
the potential fraud for each project on a 7-point Likert scale and the amount of annual budget
percentage they would allocate to each project (0% to 100%).
Independent Variables
The manipulated independent variable is the promotion outcome frame of either positive
(“yours to win”) or negative (“yours to lose”).
Control Variables
Consistent with prior research, the psychometric measure of narcissism was included as a
control variable. We also included participants internal auditor designation, if they were an internal
auditor or equivalent, and their experience level as it relates to investigating whistle blower tips
(1=not experience to 7=very experienced).
Dependent Variables
Internal is the dependent variable and is operationalized by the project description noting
the potential fraud involves an employee or non-employee, which are projects 1 and 2. The belief
is that from a social identity perspective, participants will select project one more often than project
two. Projects 3 and 4, which represents collusion (internal and external) were added as a choice
for exploratory purposes. The dependent variables are internal based on the target in the
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assignment chosen, seriousness of the potential fraud (Likert scale, 1=not at all serious to
7=extremely serious), and allocation of budget (0% to 100% in 10% increments).
4.3 Results
To test H3, that subjects will select projects to examine an employee over a non-employee,
we conducted a single sample chi-square test. The test was non-significant (p-value=0.22), which
means there was no significant difference in choice of projects between single internal and single
external. Therefore, H3 was not supported. However, if all 4 projects were included in the chisquare test, then the results were actually significant (p-value < 0.01), which indicates that there
was a difference in choice selection between the 4 projects. This is also visible when looking at
the histogram in figure 2 below.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
To test H4, that when the outcome is framed as a “promotion to win” subjects will select
projects to examine an employee over a non-employee, we perform a logistic regression analysis
with the promotion outcome frame as the independent variable factor. The same analysis was done
after adding the control variables (narcissism, internal auditor designation, and whistleblowing
investigation experience) and the results were still non-significant. Therefore, H4 is not supported.
Twenty-four participants are included in this analysis.
Furthermore, we ran some additional analysis with the two other dependent variables,
seriousness, and allocation. Since participants rated the seriousness of each project, we computed
a new variable, which was generated from all four measures together to represent overall how
serious the participants rated the projects all together. The same thing was performed to create the
variable for resource allocation. We also created a new dichotomous variable, collusion, which
divided the projects between single perpetrator with a value of zero and a collusion scenario with
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a value of one. An OLS regression was performed with allocation as the dependent variable. The
model included collusion and promotion frame as the independent variables with the interaction
between the two (N=43). Results show that the interaction was not significant. However, the effect
of the manipulation, promotion frame, was significant and positive (coefficient=0.2, p-value=
0.017), which means that when a project involved a single perpetrator those in the positive frame
allocated significantly more resources than those in the negative frame. However, when the
projects involved collusion there was no difference between negative and positive frame groups.
Figure 3 below illustrates the difference via a plot.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
5.0 STUDY THREE
5.1 Literature Review & Hypothesis Development
Emotional intelligence is defined as “The ability to perceive and express emotion,
assimilate emotions in thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in the
self and others,” (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 5). In addition, George (2000) suggests that emotional
intelligence can contribute to effective leadership in multiple ways. Someone with high emotional
intelligence displays empathy for others and is not easily rattled when procedures do not go
accordingly. Conversely, someone with low emotional intelligence may have a lack of empathy,
and cannot sufficiently control their emotions, particularly when there is a negative deviation from
plans or expectations. Research suggests that supervisors with low emotional intelligence can
result in low trust between the supervisor and employees, or even employees behaving unethically.
(Geng, 2021). From the perspective of whistleblowing, emotional intelligence can also affect
whistleblowing intentions (Geng & Fleming, 2021), and while research has specifically looked at
the effect of leaders’ emotional intelligence on subordinate’s whistleblowing intentions (Geng,
84

2017), no research has looked at how the leaders’ emotional intelligence can affect the decisions
made by internal auditors in charge of investigating potential fraud cases.
A fraud examiner with a superior that has high emotional intelligence is not likely to change
their choice of examination target (employee or non-employee), but if the superior has low
emotional intelligence, then the examiner may take this information into account, potentially
affecting their decision making. Again, building from Social Identity Theory, someone from within
the group violating norms would cause the most dissonance, and therefore might cause the most
dissonance with the low-emotional intelligence superior. This leads us to hypothesize
H5: An auditor will choose to examine a non-company employee over an employee when
their superior has low emotional intelligence.
5.2 Methodology
We discuss below the design, participants, experimental procedures and task, independent
variables, and dependent variables for experiment three.
Design
The experiment utilizes a 2 x 1 between-subject design, manipulating the emotional
intelligence of the examiner’s superior.

Participants
Fifty-five (55) participants completed experiment three. Table 4 contains the breakdown
of demographic information for study three.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Experimental Procedure and Task
Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and various psychometric base-line
instruments for the experiment(s). For experiment three, subjects read that they worked for a
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company and are involved with anti-fraud efforts of operation. They were told they had the
opportunity to select their next examination assignment from a list of four projects. They were
assigned to read one of the following whistle blower transcribed tips before selecting their project:
High emotional intelligence supervisor:
Your boss is the type of supervisor who does not get angry easily and he seems to be
thoughtful before responding to problems. The boss is also one who understands how emotionally
draining a fraud investigation can be, and can provide motivating support when things are not
going as planned. The boss can best be described as “solid as a rock.”
Low emotional intelligence supervisor:
Your boss is the type of supervisor who gets angry easily and seems to speak before he
thinks. The boss is also one who does not understand how emotionally draining a fraud
investigation can be and does not provide motivating support when things are not going as planned.
The boss can best be described as “a bull in a China shop.”
Project selection list:
1. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a company employee.
2. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a supplier to the company.
3. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving a company employee and an outside
supplier working together.
4. A potential asset misappropriation fraud involving at least two company employees.
Subjects then selected their assignment and were also given the opportunity to
parenthetically explain why it was selected. The participants were asked to rate the seriousness of
the potential fraud for each project on a 7-point Likert scale and the amount of annual budget
percentage they would allocate to each project (0% to 100%).
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Independent Variables
The manipulated independent variable is the emotional intelligence of the supervisor.
Control Variables
Consistent with prior research, the psychometric measure trust was included as a control
variable. We also asked participants if they were an internal auditor or equivalent, and to rate their
experience level as it relates to investigating whistle blower tips (1=not experience to 7=very
experienced).
Dependent Variables
Internal is the dependent variable and is operationalized by the project description noting
the potential fraud involves an employee or non-employee. The belief is that from a social identity
perspective, participants will select project one more often than project two, unless their supervisor
has low emotional intelligence, which will then reverse the preference. Projects 3 and 4, which
represents collusion are added as a choice for exploratory purposes. The dependent variables are
internal representing the assignment chosen, seriousness of the potential fraud (Likert scale, 1=not
at all serious to 7=extremely serious), and allocation of budget (0% to 100% in 10% increments).
5.3 Results
To test our hypotheses, we performed a logistic regression with internal as the dichotomous
dependent variable representing those who chose an internal project to work on versus an external
project. We ran two models, one with only the manipulation as the independent variable and
another model with all three control variables (trust, internal auditor designation and
whistleblowing investigative experience). In both models the effect of supervisor emotional
intelligence was not significant with a p-value of 0.832 and 0.88, respectively. Hence H5 is not
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supported, the level of supervisor’s emotional intelligence did not affect the individual’s choice of
project between internal versus external perpetrator.
Additional analysis was performed with seriousness and allocation. The same procedure
was performed as in study two to create a scale made up of each seriousness and allocation
measured for each of the four projects. The scales created both had an alpha that is above 0.7 (0.78
and 0.86, respectively). And also, the variable collusion was also created. An OLS regression was
performed with allocation as the dependent variable. In addition, we included the manipulation
(supervisor’s emotional intelligence) and collusion as the independent variables, including the
interaction between the two. Results show a significant interaction and a significant effect for both
independent variables. Specifically, the interaction was negative (coefficient=-0.24, p-value=
0.037, two-tailed), and in plotting the interaction (see figure 4.) we notice two things. First, that
when there was no collusion, employees with a supervisor that has high emotional intelligence
allocated significantly less resources compared to those that had a low emotionally intelligent
supervisor. Second, with those under the high emotional intelligence supervisor we notice that if
the collusion projects were selected, participants allocated more resources than those that selected
non-collusion project, whereas those with a low emotional intelligent supervisor, the subjects did
not differ in allocation between single versus collusion projects selected.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
6.0 CONCLUSION
This paper utilized three studies that experimentally explores what factors may affect fraud
examiners decisions when multiple potential frauds are present. Specifically, we measure the
participants’ demographics and personal traits (narcissism, and trust) and we manipulate the level
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of details in the tip for study one, the framing of a promotion for study two and the emotional
intelligence of the supervisor in study three to see how the factor interplay in the participants’
judgment of how serious the fraud is and how much resources they would allocate to examine the
case. Results show that experience and perception of source credibility have an effect on how
serious a fraud tip is judged and how much resources to allocate. However, promotion framing,
emotional intelligence of the supervisor, and other personality traits do not have an effect in the
experiments. Further analysis reveals an interplay between type of fraud selected (single versus
collusion) and the manipulation in study two and three.
Future studies can further explore other factors that might affect fraud examiners and can
explore whether results differ for a sample of US based auditors. Although the trio of studies utilize
a unique and hard to obtain subject pool, it would be interesting to administer the experiment to
US based lay people, in an attempt to examine risk preference differences between fraud examiners
and internal auditors to the general population.
The current study does suffer from several limitations. First, the sample is not a native
English-speaking sample, which might have negatively affected comprehension. Further,
participants participated in three studies plus a demographic and personal traits survey, which
might have caused fatigue and increased drop-out rate. Lastly, as noted above, this was a hard to
obtain subject pool, but there may be cultural differences that add to external validity concerns.
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APPENDIX:
Table 1 Participant Demographics
Female

Male

Total

41

31

72

Age

31.37

36.67

33.60

Work Experience in years

8.70

12.74

10.44

10

8

18

Gender

Internal Auditors
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Table 2 Participant Demographics (Study 1)
Female

Male

Total

37

30

67

Age

31.22

36.67

33.66

Work Experience in years

8.69

12.83

10.54

9

8

17

Gender

Internal Auditors
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Table 3 Study 1 OLS Regression Analysis
DV
serious

DV
resource

Script
Detail

0.286
(0.301)

-0.0195
(0.0510)

total
experience

0.0375*
(0.0204)

Int.
auditor

WB
experience

DV
serious

DV
resource

DV
serious

DV
resource

-0.01000***
(0.00345)

0.0480**
(0.0189)

-0.00885***
(0.00318)

0.0501***
(0.0179)

-0.00925***
(0.00333)

-0.691**

-0.0824

-0.373

-0.0386

-0.566*

-0.0778

(0.340)

(0.0580)

(0.323)

(0.0548)

(0.296)

(0.0556)

0.0458
(0.0985)

0.0296*
(0.0165)

0.0110
(0.0918)

0.0239
(0.0153)

-0.0120
(0.0874)

0.0243
(0.0161)

0.488***
(0.149)

0.0831***
(0.0252)
0.506***
(0.117)

0.0472**
(0.0219)

3.354***
(0.631)
64
0.324

0.163
(0.116)
65
0.238

Perceived
Tip detail
Credibility

_cons
N
R2

5.451***
(0.440)
64
0.121

0.379***
(0.0733)
65
0.180

3.487***
(0.748)
64
0.245

0.0139
(0.125)
65
0.304

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3 includes 6 OLS regression models.
Dependent variables: Serious is how serious the participants rated the whistleblower tip; higher scores mean more
serious rating. Resource is how much of resources, as a percentage, the participants allocated to examine the tip.
Independent variables: Script Detail is the manipulated variable (0 = less detailed, 1 = more detailed). Total
experience is work experience in years. Int. Auditor is a dichotomous variable (0 = participant is not an internal
auditor, 1 = participant is an internal auditor). WB Experience represents participants’ experience investigating
whistleblower tips, higher score means more experienced. Perceived tip detail is how much detail the participants
perceived in the tip presented, higher score equals more detailed. Credibility is how credible the participants
perceived in the tip presented, higher score equals more credible.

92

Table 4 Participant Demographics (Study 2)
Female

Male

Total

25

21

46

Age

30.72

35.9

33.02

Work Experience in years

7.82

12.38

9.90

5

7

12

Gender

Internal Auditors
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Table 5 Study 2 Analysis

Promotion frame
(0 -ve, 1 +ve)

Logit
Study2 internal

Logit
Study2 internal

OLS Regression
Study2 Allocation

1.386
(1.194)

1.557
(1.252)

0.204**
(0.0820)

narcissism

0.0537
(0.0555)

Int. audit

0.0213
(0.972)

WB
Experience

-0.247
(0.377)

Collusion

0.0703
(0.0627)

Collusion*
Prom. frame

-0.161
(0.114)

_cons
N
R2

0.223
(0.474)
24

-0.698
(2.059)
24

0.380***
(0.0428)
43
0.148

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5 includes two logistic regression and 1 OLS regression models.
Dependent variables: Internal is a dichotomous variable showing whether participants selected to examine a project
that involved an internal employee or an external party (0 = external, 1 = internal). Allocation is a continuous
variable generated based on how much of the resources, as a percentage, the participants allocated to examine the
four potential projects. Higher allocation scores represent higher resources being allocated.
Independent variables: Promotion frame is the manipulated variable (0 = negative frame, 1 = positive frame).
Narcissism represents the degree of the trait of narcissism within the participant with higher scores reflecting more
narcissistic individuals. Int. Auditor is a dichotomous variable (0 = participant is not an internal auditor, 1 =
participant is an internal auditor). WB Experience represents participants’ experience investigating whistleblower
tips, higher score means more experienced. Collusion is a dichotomous variable based on the type of project selected
to examine (0 = fraud project with single fraud perpetrator, 1 = fraud project that involves collusion between two
parties)
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Table 6 Participant Demographics (Study 3)
Female

Male

Total

28

27

55

Age

31.43

36.85

34.04

Work Experience in years

8.48

13.11

10.75

8

8

16

Gender

Internal Auditors
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Table 7 Study 3 Analysis

Supervisor
E.I. (0 high, 1
low)

Logit
Study 3 internal

Logit
Study 3 internal

OLS Regression
Study 3 Allocation

0.223
(1.049)

-0.206
(1.358)

0.224**
(0.0944)

Trust

-0.0693
(0.0678)

Int. audit

1.949
(1.259)

WB
Experience

0.180
(0.390)

Collusion
(0 single, 1 collu.)

0.198**
(0.0916)

Collusion*
Supervisor E.I.

-0.244**
(0.114)

_cons
N
R2

0.693
(0.866)
20

5.404
(6.544)
20

0.285***
(0.0810)
52
0.110

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 7 includes two logistic regression and 1 OLS regression models.
Dependent variables: Internal is a dichotomous variable showing whether participants selected to examine a project
that involved an internal employee or an external party (0 = external, 1 = internal). Allocation is a continuous
variable generated based on how much of the resources, as a percentage, the participants allocated to examine the
four potential projects. Higher allocation scores represent higher resources being allocated.
Independent variables: Supervisor E.I. is the manipulated variable (0 = manager has high emotional intelligence, 1 =
manager has low emotional intelligence). Trust is continuous variable representing how trusting the participant is,
higher scores represent a more trusting individual. Int. Auditor is a dichotomous variable (0 = participant is not an
internal auditor, 1 = participant is an internal auditor). WB Experience represents participants’ experience
investigating whistleblower tips, higher score means more experienced. Collusion is a dichotomous variable based
on the type of project selected to examine (0 = fraud project with single fraud perpetrator, 1 = fraud project that
involves collusion between two parties)
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Figure 2. Study 2:
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Figure 3. Study 2:
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Figure 4. Study 3:

100

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Fraud has proven to be very costly to organizations and thus is the focus of this dissertation.
In this dissertation I study the individual who may commit fraud, I study the individual who may
report fraud, and I study the individual who may examine fraud.
I begin with a study regarding individuals who may commit fraud, and I center on how
technology can affect potential fraudsters, specifically if technology has an impact on
psychological distancing. I find that an individual’s attachment to technology does have a
moderating effect and that psychological distance does play a role in ethical behavior. Results
show moderate support for attachment/familiarity to technology acting as a moderator where we
see individuals that are more familiar with technology were more ethical in a more real (less
psychologically distant) group compared to those who less familiar with technology, whereas the
two groups did not differ when they were in a less real group. This may be even more important
in the future as more companies allow employees to work remotely.
The second study examines the employee tipster through the interplay of external factors
(framing of a code of conduct and perception of co-worker ethics) and internal factors (personality
traits, perception of self-ethics and demographics) on the decision to blow the whistle when
financial incentives are present. Results show that both external and internal factors matter as to
whether a potential whistleblower decides to report early or delay reporting to gain additional gains.
The third and last study explores fraud from the internal fraud examiner’s perspective. The
study seeks to better understand what factors affect the choice of fraud case to examine. In a series
of three experimental studies, results show that perception of how credible the whistleblower tip
is, and work experience affected both how the examiner rates the seriousness of the tip and how
much of the budget should be allocated to examine the tip. However, results show no support for
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a relationship between examiner’s personal traits, such as skepticism, tolerance for ambiguity, trust,
narcissism, and risk literacy on the examiners’ preferences on which fraud case to examine. A
better understanding of factors that affect fraud examiners can improve the efficiency of future
examinations.
This dissertation in total helps expand our practical and theoretical knowledge of behavior
as it relates to fraud. It is, though, only a small part of a growing body of literature. Each study
highlights my finding and non-findings, and develops a path for continued and future research.
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